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621 
MODERNIZING THE STOCKHOLDER 
SHIELD: HOW BLOCKCHAINS AND 
DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS COULD  
RESCUE THE APPRAISAL REMEDY 
Abstract: A recent wave of appraisal litigation has highlighted costly flaws in 
Delaware’s appraisal law. The genesis of the problems stems from dilapidated as-
sumptions about stock ownership and corporate record keeping baked into the 
Delaware General Corporation Law. Technological advancements, namely dis-
tributed ledgers and blockchain technology, promise to bring Delaware’s apprais-
al law into the twenty-first century while remaining consistent with existing ap-
praisal law. Distributed ledgers and blockchain technology promise lightning fast 
clearing times, infallible record keeping, and cost-efficient modes of transfer. 
States, private actors, and laypersons are already recognizing the litany of bene-
fits offered by these technologies. This Note explores the flaws in the current ap-
praisal system, discusses the benefits offered by distributed ledgers and block-
chain technology, and demonstrates how blockchain technology can modernize 
not only corporate record keeping but appraisal litigation as well. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bitcoin has been championed as a cryptocurrency with the power to re-
place modern banking and revolutionize the exchange of goods and services.1 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Noelle Acheson, Why Use Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/
information/why-use-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/J5JB-UQSR] (explaining that bitcoin was designed to 
supplant traditional modes of payment—with faster speeds—at a fraction of the cost); see Shobhit 
Seth, How Bitcoin Can Change the World, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.investopedia.
com/articles/investing/032615/how-bitcoin-can-change-world.asp [https://perma.cc/NGK7-TFNP] 
(noting how bitcoin might revolutionize banking and monetary transfer); see also Joshua Althauser, 
Israeli PM: Bitcoin Could Replace Banks, COIN TELEGRAPH (Dec. 14, 2017), https://cointelegraph.
com/news/israeli-pm-bitcoin-could-replace-banks [https://perma.cc/GH4V-ZWTL] (noting the opin-
ion of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies could 
replace banks because the blockchain technology underlying bitcoin permits parties to transact direct-
ly, without the use of bank intermediaries). “Bitcoin” is a “cryptocurrency”—an electronic token or 
asset that relies on encrypted series of mathematical codes to ensure security—that can be used in 
place of cash for any transaction. Nathaniel Popper, What Is Bitcoin, and How Does It Work?, N.Y. 
TIMES: TECH. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/technology/what-is-bitcoin-
price.html [https://perma.cc/8X9R-MCDN]; see Alice Huang, Note, Reaching Within Silk Road: The 
Need for a New Subpoena Power That Targets Illegal Bitcoin Transactions, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2093, 
2097–98 (2015) (describing cryptocurrencies as “computer files, similar to actual cash,” that, like 
cash, “can be destroyed or lost”); Cryptocurrency, DICTIONARY.COM (Mar. 10, 2018), http://
www.dictionary.com/browse/cryptocurrency?s=t [https://perma.cc/H8HP-MDLS] (defining “crypto-
currency” as “a digital currency or decentralized system of exchange that uses advanced cryptography 
for security”). Bitcoin is one of many cryptocurrencies that can be made at any time by computer 
programmers; each “coin” has its own volatile, independent value. See Usman W. Chohan, Discussion 
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Thus, it should come as no surprise that the value of bitcoin and other crypto-
currencies have recently skyrocketed.2 What may come as a surprise, however, 
is that the technologies underlying bitcoin—distributed ledgers and blockchain 
networks—are more valuable than the coins themselves.3 
                                                                                                                           
Paper, Cryptocurrencies: A Brief Thematic Review, ECON. NETWORKS J., Aug. 4, 2017, at 1 (com-
menting on the wide variety of cryptocurrencies); see also Popper, supra (describing the value of 
cryptocurrencies and their geneses). Bitcoin gets its value by open-market consensus, similar to the 
value of stocks or the dollar. See Popper, supra. Bitcoins are generated by a process called “mining” 
whereby participants on the bitcoin network run a program on their computers to solve a computation-
ally-dense algorithm. Id.; see infra notes 203–206 and accompanying text (explaining the validation 
mechanism and proof of work protocol). The first to solve the puzzle is rewarded with bitcoins. Pop-
per, supra. It is important to understand from the outset that this Note focuses on the network and 
technology underlying bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, rather than the cryptocurrencies themselves. 
 2 Bitcoin (USD) Price, COINDESK (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/price/ [https://
perma.cc/5FMZ-HX92] (providing a chart of the price of bitcoin in dollars). On January 1, 2016, the 
price of one bitcoin was merely $434. Id. In January 2017, bitcoin saw a spike in price to $1,000. Id. 
By July 2017, the price of bitcoin rose to over $2,600. Id. During the following six months, the price 
of bitcoin drastically increased, peaking at just under $20,000 on December 16, 2017. Id. Since 
Bitcoin’s historic apex, the price of the cryptocurrency plummeted, falling to a low of almost $6,900 
on February 5, 2018. Id. On March 7, 2018, bitcoin was trading at nearly $10,000, but sustained a near 
10% loss following the release of a report from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that 
cryptocurrency exchanges must register with the SEC as “exchanges,” falling subject to SEC regula-
tion. See Thomas Franck, Bitcoin Just Tanked Below $10,000 After SEC Says Crypto Exchanges Must 
Register with Agency, CNBC (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/07/bitcoin-just-tanked-
below-10000-after-sec-says-crypto-exchanges-must-register-with-agency.html [https://perma.cc/
EM59-5NM2] (discussing the recent plummet in bitcoin price following SEC guidance). See general-
ly Statement on Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Mar. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Unlawful Platforms], https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/enforcement-tm-statement-potentially-unlawful-online-platforms-trading [https://perma.cc/
U267-FQBD] (discussing recently regulatory requirements imposed on cryptocurrency exchanges). 
As of January 27, 2019, Bitcoin is trading at roughly $3,500. Bitcoin (USD) Price, supra. 
 3 Judith Alison Lee, Blockchain 101, Payment Sys. & Elec. Fund Transfers Guide 100:100, at 1 
(Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Blockchain 101] (commenting on the popularity of bitcoin, but noting 
“there is a growing view that the true innovation is the infrastructure underlying virtual currencies—
the decentralized ledger of transactions called the ‘blockchain’”); see Robert Hackett, Why Big Busi-
ness Is Racing to Build Blockchains, FORTUNE (Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/
bitcoin-ethereum-blockchain-cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/VA3Q-S383] (describing the crypto-
currency craze as “crypto-hysteria,” and noting that the underlying blockchain technology was the 
“grand innovation in the humble realm of accounting”); see also Tiernan Ray, Blockchain: Yes, It’s 
Real, Says JPMorgan’s Dimon, BARRONS: TECH. TRADER DAILY (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.
barrons.com/articles/blockchain-yes-its-real-says-jpmorgans-dimon-1453305727 [https://perma.cc/
MYQ2-7R2H] (describing the opinions of the CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase, Jamie Dimon, towards 
bitcoin and blockchain technology, noting that Mr. Dimon sees no future in bitcoin, but finds block-
chain technology to have real value). It is important to distinguish between blockchain technology and 
the cryptocurrencies that are programmed onto the blockchain networks. Fiammetta S. Piazza, Bitcoin 
and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance Tools: Strengths and Weaknesses, 5 PENN ST. 
J.L. & INT’L AFF. 262, 274 (2017). A “blockchain network” is a decentralized platform that allows 
users to communicate and freely transfer assets between each other without the use of financial inter-
mediaries. Robert Hackett, Wait, What Is Blockchain?, FORTUNE (May 23, 2016), http://fortune.com/
2016/05/23/blockchain-definition/ [https://perma.cc/6EJZ-BDYX] (describing how blockchain shares 
ledgers of transactions among participants without intermediaries validating transactions). Blockchain 
networks record transactions that occur on the network to “distributed ledgers”: ledgers that are avail-
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Distributed ledgers are electronic registers of transactions that are made 
available to all participants on the distributed ledger’s network.4 Distributed 
ledgers allow for fast and secure transactions that do not need to travel through 
the books of trusted third parties before clearing and settling.5 One area that 
can immediately benefit from distributed ledger technology is appraisal litiga-
tion following corporate mergers.6 
                                                                                                                           
able to all participants on a blockchain network that can only be updated or changed by meeting cer-
tain requirements, like a majority consensus. See U.K. GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, DISTRIBUTED 
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 17 (2016) (describing blockchains as a “type of data-
base that takes a number of records and puts them in a block . . . [e]ach block is then ‘chained’ to the 
next block . . .[;] [t]his allows blockchains to be used like a ledger, which can be shares and corrobo-
rated by anyone with . . . permissions.”); see also David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Block-
chains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 11 (2017) (noting that distributed ledgers are “essential component[s]” of the 
Bitcoin blockchain system). Bitcoin, unlike the blockchain network, is merely lines of computer code 
grafted onto the blockchain network that represents a record of an asset (or, more specifically, repre-
sents the asset itself). See Piazza, supra, at 267 (distinguishing Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies 
from blockchain networks). 
 4 George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 255 (2018) (“A 
distributed ledger is simply a sequential database of assets that is shared across a network of users. It 
is distributed in the sense that all participants . . . have their own copy of the ledger identifying both 
historical transactions and the resulting ownership rights associated with the entire group of assets.”); 
see COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN 
PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 2 (Feb. 2017) [hereinafter 
COMM. ON PAYMENTS], https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d157.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TC3-7EZR] (de-
scribing distributed ledger technology as “the processes and related technologies that enable nodes in 
a network . . . to securely propose, validate, and record state changes to a synchronized ledger that is 
distributed across the network’s nodes”) (italics removed); see also U.K. GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, 
supra note 3, at 17–18 (describing distributed ledgers are public databases with sequentially-stored 
records that are updated with a “certain quorum”). Distributed ledger technology can reform securities 
markets by: simplifying transfer processes, decreasing transfer and settlement times, maintaining only 
one ledger as opposed to several across different financial intermediaries, and reducing risks by limit-
ing the opportunities to edit the ledger, all while improving transparency between network partici-
pants. COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra, at 1. 
 5 Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE 
L. J. 569, 574 (2015) (describing blockchain networks as “trustless,” meaning that they can support 
transactions without the need for an intermediary); see U.K. GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, supra note 3, 
at 36 (proposing blockchain technology as a “common solution” to problems posed by traditional 
record keeping methods in banking, offering that distributed ledgers could maintain accurate and 
timely records of transactions without the need for clearing and settlement intermediaries); see also 
Riley T. Svikhart, Note, Blockchain’s Big Hurdle, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 101 (2017), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/blockchains-big-hurdle/ [https://perma.cc/48P3-QDLY] 
(discussing that bitcoin uses blockchain technology to displace trusted third-party validations) (inter-
nal quotations omitted); OLIVER WYMAN, BLOCKCHAIN IN CAPITAL MARKETS: THE PRIZE AND THE 
JOURNEY 6 (2016), https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/feb/
BlockChain-In-Capital-Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/69HS-UTMD] (recognizing that distributed 
ledger technology opens pathways to maintain shared, accurate ledgers unlike any implemented pre-
viously). 
 6 See Geis, supra note 4, at 271–72 (arguing that blockchain technology can fix problems in ap-
praisal litigation where intermediary holding systems create a rift between state appraisal law and 
securities ownership realities, resulting in the inadvertent loss of the appraisal right for some stock-
holders). 
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In the event of a merger or consolidation, Title 8, Section 262 of the Del-
aware General Corporation Law provides stockholders who oppose the trans-
action, or abstain from voting, with a way out of the deal by receiving the judi-
cially-appraised fair value for their shares: the appraisal remedy.7 Because cor-
porations are inherently democratic creatures,8 this remedy was intended to act 
as a shield for minority shareholders against renegade majorities.9 
Historically, appraisal has seen little use.10 In recent years, however, ap-
praisal litigation has seen a spike in activity, highlighting problems with the 
current appraisal system that stem from conflicts between Delaware’s incorrect 
assumption that stocks are owned directly and realities about stock ownership 
under the current indirect ownership regime.11 
                                                                                                                           
 7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2016); CLAIRE HILL ET AL., MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: 
LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 61 (2006). For simplicity, this Note will use the term “merger” to 
represent both mergers and consolidations under Section 262 of the Delaware corporate law. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262. 
 8 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine 
Fair Value, 47 DUKE L. J. 613, 613 (1998) (describing the “democratic” nature of corporations). 
 9 See Wertheimer, supra note 8 at 613 (discussing the potential negative effect of majority rule on 
minority shareholders). For example, when stockholder preferences diverge with respect to short-term 
or long-term investment strategies, minority stockholders may be at risk of having their shares artifi-
cially devalued at the hands of the majority for the purposes of short-term gains. Id. 
 10 HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 78 (describing appraisal as “a lonely backwater for corporate 
work”). Appraisal has been criticized as being too procedurally burdensome, ineffective to amass 
change, and costly for the few petitioners for whom appraisal may actually be worthwhile. Charles R. 
Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1551, 1561 (2015) (surveying leading casebooks that describe appraisal as “a cumbersome 
remedy” with a “complicated maze” of procedural burdens) (citation omitted). 
 11 HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 78; see Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1567 (discussing 
empirical data supporting that “appraisal activity involving public companies increased substantially 
starting in 2011, as measured both by the number of [appraisal] petitions filed and the value of the 
dissenting shares”); see, e.g., J. Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery, Keynote 
Speech at the Chicago Council of Institutional Investors, The Block Chain Plunger: Using Technology 
to Clean Up Proxy Plumbing and Take Back the Vote, at 6–7 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.cii.org/
files/09_29_16_laster_remarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B2W-22F9] (discussing In re Appraisal of Dell 
Inc., 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015), and how the current problems with the appraisal 
system have had negative effects on stockholders). For example, some stockholders have lost their 
ability to seek appraisal (lost their shields) at the standing phase because of internal policies within the 
banks that held the stockholders’ shares when the banks retitled the stockholders’ shares without the 
stockholders’ consent. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc. (Dell Ownership), 2015 WL 4313206, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015) (finding that, when the custodial banks retitled the shares, the stockhold-
ers forfeited their rights to appraisal). In other instances, stockholders have had their shields bol-
stered—permitted to seek appraisal despite an inability to meet procedural requirements—when the 
stockholders did not have to show that the particular shares upon which the stockholders sought ap-
praisal were not voted in favor of the merger. In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. (Tran-
skaryotic), 2007 WL 1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (finding that the “literal terms” of the 
appraisal statute do not require beneficial owners to perfect their rights to appraisal). The metaphor of 
a “shield” in the context of appraisal rights has been explored at least once before. See, e.g., Stanley 
Onyeador, Note, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs Expose Need to Further 
Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339, 349–51 (2017). In other appraisal con-
texts, the concept of a shield is used to represent the five percent above-market interest rate provided 
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Recent technological developments, namely distributed ledger technolo-
gies, promise to clean up the procedural requirements for perfecting the ap-
praisal remedy by issuing shares directly, via blockchain networks, thus rea-
ligning realities of stock ownership with Delaware law’s assumptions about 
how stocks are held.12 Issuing shares via blockchain networks can prevent 
stockholders’ shields from buckling under the pressure of Section 262’s proce-
dural requirements while also ensuring that those stockholders are fairly held 
to their statutory burdens.13 Specifically, stockholders are required to demon-
strate they did not vote in favor of the merger and are entitled to appraisal.14 
Part I of this Note provides a background of both Delaware’s appraisal 
remedy and the federal stock immobilization policy and introduces the prob-
lems that flow from the Delaware statute’s failure to grapple with realities in 
the securities market.15 Part II explains the concept of distributed ledgers and 
blockchain technology, introduces how bitcoin works on the blockchain net-
work, and discusses the general trend of approval for blockchain technology’s 
adoption and use.16 Part III argues that blockchain technology can realign Del-
aware appraisal law with securities ownership realities.17 
                                                                                                                           
to appraisal stockholders. See, e.g., id. In this Note, however, the concept of a “shield” refers to the 
appraisal remedy in its entirety, used to defend stockholders from receiving inadequate merger con-
sideration. 
 12 Laster, supra note 11, at 16 (advocating that “distributed ledger technologies can provide better 
accuracy, greater transparency, and superior efficiency for settling securities trades and voting in cor-
porate elections”); Stephen Fox, Recent Cases Demonstrate Need for Blockchain, HARVARD LAW 
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Aug. 8, 2017), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2017/08/08/recent-cases-demonstrate-need-for-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/W6MB-
L974] (noting that issuing shares on a blockchain “raises the possibility of cutting out intermediaries” 
and “investors would be able to directly own shares”); see Geis, supra note 4, at 263 (discussing a 
securities market based on blockchain technology, supposing that “[i]t is possible to imagine a world 
of complete disintermediation, where individual investors join exchanges directly, downloading soft-
ware to participate as full members of a distributed ledger,” and that those investors “could buy or sell 
stock directly through the exchange”). 
 13 See infra notes 260–267 and accompanying text (explaining how blockchain-based voting 
ensures that stockholder’s voting preferences are preserved without error). 
 14 See infra notes 287–308 and accompanying text. For example, distributed ledgers eliminate the 
current problems of not knowing how shares were voted and by whom, while also ensuing that indi-
rect ownership does not interfere with a stockholder’s right to have their shares appraised. Yermack, 
supra note 3, at 17 (discussing the transparency of ownership provided by blockchains); see In re 
Dole Food Co. (Dole), 2017 WL 624842, at *4 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017) (proposing blockchain 
technology could fix problems of tracing share ownership). 
 15 See infra notes 18–178 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 179–238 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 239–308 and accompanying text. 
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I. SECURITIES OWNERSHIP, APPRAISAL, AND ENSUING PROBLEMS 
Section A of this Part begins by providing an overview of modern securi-
ties ownership and the federal stock immobilization policy.18 Section B dis-
cusses the history and policies underlying the appraisal remedy and identifies 
some modern trends in appraisal litigation.19 Section C then details the various 
requirements and intricacies of the Delaware appraisal statute.20 Finally, Sec-
tion D concludes with a discussion of the problems flowing from Delaware the 
appraisal statute and the federal stock immobilization policy.21 
A. Modern Securities Realities: Federal Securities Laws and Cede 
Prior to 1970, stock of public corporations was transferred by signing and 
delivering physical stock certificates.22 Corporations were notified of the trans-
fers and were then able to reflect a change of ownership on their stock ledg-
ers.23 This process of physically endorsing stock transfers was arduous and 
paper-intensive,24 amassing “crisis proportions” by the late 1960’s due to a 
growing securities market.25 In an effort to resolve the crisis, Congress author-
ized the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue a policy that 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 22–58 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 59–81 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 82–112 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 113–178 and accompanying text. 
 22 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell Ownership), 2015 WL 4313206, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 30, 
2015); David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the U.S. Proxy System and 
Its Solution, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41, 50 (2011); James S. Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised 
U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1442 (1996); see Wyatt Wells, Certificates & Computers: 
The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 201 (2000) (discussing how the 
process for “transferring ownership” of securities “revolved around the stock certificate”). 
 23 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *4. A stock ledger is a list containing all transfers to 
and by particular stockholders that provides corporations with the identities of their owners. Id. at *9 
(discussing how stock ledgers help corporations determine who its stockholders are on a particular 
date). In the event there was a broker intermediary between buyer and seller, the seller would transfer 
the stock to his brokerage firm, then the brokerage firm would receive the physical stock certificate 
and deliver it to the buyer, the new record owner, unless the buyer decided to keep the certificate in 
the physical possession of their brokerage firm for ease of trade. Id. at *4 (citing Suellen M. Wolfe, 
Escheat and the Challenge of Apportionment: A Bright Line Test to Slice a Shadow, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 
173, 178–88 (1995)). 
 24 Id. at *4 (discussing the “paperwork crisis” on Wall street during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, noting, “no one could cope with the burdens of documenting stock trades using paper certifi-
cates”). The paperwork crisis was so debilitating that stock certificates were piled “halfway to the 
ceiling,” and some companies had to declare bankruptcy and realize losses because they were so 
backed up with paperwork. Id. at *5. This certificate-based system was paper intensive because it 
required the physical delivery of certificate from seller to buyer every time a transfer occurred. Id. at 
*4. 
 25 Id. at *1; see Wells, supra note 22, at 200 (discussing the “heavy pressure” increased trading 
volume put on Wall Street back offices in 1968). 
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“immobilized” stock, disallowing the physical transfer of stock certificates.26 
In 1973, the member companies of the New York Stock Exchange banded to-
gether to create a depository system that would eliminate the need to physical-
ly transfer stock.27 They created the Depository Trust Company (“DTC”) to 
serve as a centralized hub to hold, manage, and clear their stocks and trans-
fers.28 
DTC operates by holding “jumbo” stock certificates of its participants (typ-
ically banks or brokers) in the name of its nominee, Cede & Co. (“Cede”).29 
Whenever a participating public corporation issues stock, the stock is regis-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *5; see Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 
U.S.C. § 78kkk(g) (2012) (directing the SEC, in 1970, to “compile a list of unsafe or unsound practic-
es” concerning the securities crisis and to propose recommendations to Congress); see also Securities 
Acts Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 78q–1(e) (2012) (“The [SEC] shall use its authority under this 
chapter to end the physical movement of securities certificates in connection with the settlement 
among brokers and dealers of transactions in securities consummated by means of the mails or any 
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce”). Originally, Congress authorized the SEC to in-
vestigate the genesis of the paperwork problem. Donald, supra note 22, at 54. The SEC’s investigation 
culminated in a report that ultimately prompted the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (“SAA”). Id. 
It was the SAA that mandated the immobilization of securities and paved the way for an indirect hold-
ing system. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(e) (granting the SEC the authority to immobilize stock certifi-
cate transfers). Leading up to the SAA, and during the investigation of the paperwork problem, inter-
estingly enough, two solutions were heavily debated: (1) a centralized depository system that would 
hold stock certificates and assign rights to the securities it held to participants, and (2) a decentralized 
computer network that would have linked corporate stock ledgers, allowing for transfer of securities to 
directly change a corporation’s ledger. Donald, supra note 22, at 54. The banking industry lobbied for 
the former solution, while most market participants favored the latter. Id. at 56–57. The second model, 
ultimately rejected, would have burdened issuing corporations with retroactively turning their paper 
stock certificates into electronic recordings, whereas the first model, a centralized depository, would 
have outsourced the problem to an intermediary by having the intermediary hold and maintain a rec-
ord of all issued shares. Id. at 56. Decertificating shares would have also required every state to prom-
ulgate laws allowing for their issuance. Id. at 58. Moreover, the technology in the 1970s simply could 
not provide the quick and safe integration that the market needed at that time. Id. at 57. Eventually, the 
centralized depository system was set in place: originally designed to be a transient solution on the 
road to a truly paperless securities market, but evidently became a permanent fixture in the securities 
market. Id. at 57. See generally id. (providing a more complete discussion of the history and policies 
behind the depository system and the Depository and Trust Clearing Corporation). 
 27 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *5. See generally Wells, supra note 22 (providing a 
more complete discussion of the great pains that the NYSE and its members went through to establish 
a working stock certificate depository). 
 28 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *5. In 1999, a new holding company, the Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”) was created and became parent to the Depository Trust 
Company (“DTC”). Donald, supra note 22, at 59. Today, DTC is the largest securities depository and 
the only domestic depository. Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *5. DTC holds over three quar-
ters of publically traded stock. Id. DTC is owned by its participant companies, which are all public 
companies on various national exchanges. Id. 
 29 Id. at *4; see Donald, supra note 22, at 50 (discussing the securities holding system following 
the paperwork crisis in the 1970s, noting that stock certificates under the DTC system are “certificated 
as ‘jumbo’ or ‘global’ certificates that evidence millions of dollars of securities on one certificate”). 
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tered in Cede’s name.30 This gives Cede the legal title to the securities.31 Hold-
ers of legal title to stock are often referred to as being “record” holders, or 
“registered” holders.32 The issuance of stock is reflected in a corporation’s 
stock ledger by listing Cede as the registered owner of the issuer’s securities.33 
Any certificates given to Cede are electronically registered and kept in an 
undifferentiated pool (colloquially referred to as “fungible bulk”), precluding 
any investor, bank, or broker from owning or transferring any one, particular 
physical share.34 Instead, DTC participants—banks and brokers—maintain an 
electronic position with DTC that represents their proportional ownership of 
Cede’s aggregate holding in a corporation.35 Any transfer—for example, a sale 
on a public stock exchange—is cleared and reflected in DTC’s electronic sys-
tem by debiting or crediting DTC participants’ accounts.36 In other words, any 
shares that are bought or sold in the open market never actually leave Cede’s 
legal ownership—rather, electronic percentages of the fungible bulk are just 
shifted from one account to another on Cede’s books.37 Individual investors do 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See, e.g., Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (“The Funds held their shares through their 
custodial banks. By virtue of this relationship, the Funds did not have legal title to the shares, they 
were beneficial owners. But the custodial banks did not have legal title either. The shares they held 
were registered in the name of [Cede].”); John C. Wilcox & Niels C. Holch, “Street Name” Registra-
tion & The Proxy Solicitation Process, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY & COMPENSATION 
RULES § 11.02 (5th ed. 2018) (describing DTC’s share registration process). 
 31 See, e.g., Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at. *1 (describing that Cede held legal title to the 
beneficial stockholders’ shares). 
 32 Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02 (“The legal owners of . . . stock are commonly re-
ferred to as either the ‘registered’ owners of the shares, because the owners’ names appear on the 
company’s register or . . . the ‘record’ owners because they legally own the shares on the record 
date”). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. (Transkaryotic), 2007 WL 1378345, at *2 
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (describing the “fungible bulk,” to mean that “no DTC participant, no custom-
er of any participant (such as an intermediary bank or broker), and no investor who might ultimately 
have a beneficial interest in securities registered to Cede, has any ownership rights to any particular 
share of stock reflected on a certificate held by Cede”). In fact, in 1995, the SEC released an order 
mandating that all newly issued public securities be made eligible for the depository system. Rogers, 
supra note 22, at 1445. 
 35 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *2. DTC maintains a record of its participants’ positions 
through a Fast Automated Securities Transfer account (the “FAST” account). Dell Ownership, 2015 
WL 4313206, at *1; see Geis, supra note 4, at 233 (discussing the clearing and settlement processes of 
DTC, noting, “[DTC] transfers beneficial ownership electronically from seller to buyer via bookkeep-
ing adjustments”). 
 36 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *2. 
 37 Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02 (“John Investor purchased 200 shares of IBM com-
mon stock through his broker, Morgan Stanley (a DTC participant). John Investor’s shares are a small 
fraction of the total shares deposited in Morgan Stanley’s participant account (e.g. 10 million shares), 
which in turn are a small fraction of the total number of IBM shares represented by certificates held in 
DTC’s vaults (e.g. 950 million shares). (DTC’s entire position (e.g. 950 million shares) is represented 
on IBM’s share register under the name ‘Cede & Co.’) After John Investor gave his broker the instruc-
tion to purchase the shares, his broker obtained them in the market from one or more sellers, each of 
2019] Blockchains, Distributed Ledgers, and Appraisal Rights 629 
not hold accounts with DTC—in fact, DTC may never know the individual 
investors exist or have rights the stock Cede holds.38 Instead, DTC participants 
act as an intermediary in the chain of ownership between DTC and individual 
investors.39 Just as Cede assigns economic rights in the stock to its partici-
pants, the participant banks and brokers assign those economic rights in the 
stock to their clients.40 
Neither Cede, DTC, nor the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
(the parent holding company of DTC and Cede, “DTCC”) have an economic 
interest in the shares they hold.41 Instead, economic ownership, or beneficial 
ownership, belongs to DTC participants—brokers and banks—and the clients 
of those participants.42 The only way to determine who actually has a benefi-
cial interest in a corporation for stock held in street name is to look through 
Cede and examine DTC’s electronic book-entry system to determine what pro-
portion a bank or broker holds.43 Information about DTC’s participants is read-
ily available for inquiring corporations, often referred to as a “Cede break-
down.”44 To obtain a truly accurate picture of who owns stock in a particular 
corporation, one must take the further step of looking at the participant banks 
                                                                                                                           
which ultimately had its own DTC participant account. To effectuate the trade, DTC reduced the sell-
ing participants’ accounts by an aggregate of 200 and increased Morgan Stanley’s account by 200. 
These bookkeeping entries do not involve the creation or movement of the IBM stock certificates in 
DTC’s vaults.”); see Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (describing the Cede’s ownership 
structure and the resultant effects on corporate ledgers). 
 38 Geis, supra note 4, at 233 (noting how DTCC does not delve into share allocation among its 
bank’s clients). 
 39 Id. In fact, individual investors cannot directly contact Cede and have Cede seek appraisal on 
their behalf. Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc. (BMC Software), 2015 WL 67586, at *2 n.12 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015). Investors must direct their custodial banks or brokers to instruct Cede to seek 
appraisal for the investors. Id. 
 40 Geis, supra note 4, at 233–34 (describing the process of broker-dealers assigning rights in stock 
to their clients). 
 41 Robert S. Reder & Stanley Onyeador, Delaware Chancery Disqualifies Lead Petitioners in Dell 
Appraisal Who Inadvertently Vote “FOR” Management Buyout, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 279, 281–
82 (2016), https://cdn.vanderbilt.edu/vu-wp0/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2016/11/30103807/Delaware-
Chancery-Disqualifies-Lead-Petitioners-in-Dell-Appraisal-Who-Inadvertently-Voted-%E2%80%9C
FOR%E2%80%9D-Management-Buyout.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5GA-2VYV] (describing Cede’s 
securities’ ownership structure). 
 42 Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02. Shares held in this way are said to be held in “street 
name.” Id. 
 43 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1, *7. 
 44 See id. at *6 (noting the “ease” with which a Delaware corporation can acquire a Cede break-
down). A “Cede Breakdown” allows issuing corporations to look past Cede and determine, on a given 
date, which custodial banks and brokers are the first link on the chain of economic ownership. Id. 
DTC is required under federal law to provide issuing corporations with a list of all securities held in 
Cede’s name. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-8(b) (2012)) (requiring DTC to “furnish a securities 
position listing promptly to each issuer whose securities are held in the name of the clearing agency or 
its nominee”). A Cede breakdown can be acquired quickly. Id. (noting that Cede breakdowns are 
accessible “in a manner of minutes”). To obtain a Cede breakdown, an issuing corporation merely has 
to visit DTC’s website or call DTC itself. Id. 
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and brokers’ books to identify their clients with rights in the stock.45 Below is a 




As illustrated above, the stock immobilization policy made Cede the 
holder of legal title, at all times, for nearly every publicly traded company on 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02 (describing how Cede only manages its participants’ 
accounts by netting balances between them). 
 46 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell Dissenters), 143 A.3d 20, 25 (Del. Ch. 2016). This chart, also 
available at https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-
2/ferrick-graphic.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QCT-3V89], illustrates the chain of ownership in a 2016 
Delaware Court of Chancery case. Id. The issuing corporation in this picture is Dell. Id. Like most 
publicly traded Delaware corporations, Dell issued its shares in Cede’s name, giving Cede full legal 
title to the issued shares. Id. There were also other names on the stock ledger, probably non-public or 
unregistered stockholders (the existence of other names on the ledger in this diagram is not relevant 
for the purposes of this Note). See id. at 24–25 (generally discussing Dell’s ownership structure). As 
discussed above, in Delaware, issuing shares to Cede has the legal effect of making Cede the record 
holder. Id. at 24. Cede, as record holder, can then assign rights to the shares that it holds to its partici-
pating banks and brokers. Id. Here, Cede assigned the economic rights in its shares to State Street, a 
large investment management company. Id. In this case, State Street acted as a mere custodian for its 
client T. Rowe Price. Id. Thus, State Street assigned the rights in the stock it received from Cede to T. 
Rowe Price (and whichever other clients decided to invest in Dell common stock through State 
Street). Id. At the custodian level, for purposes of federal law, State Street is considered to be a record 
holder. Id. Under Delaware law, however, State Street is only a beneficial owner. Id. This is discussed 
in more detail below. See infra notes 98–102 and accompanying text (describing the Delaware benefi-
cial ownership system). Because State Street is a beneficial owner, its actions have no legal effect for 
the purposes of perfecting Delaware’s appraisal procedural requirements. See Transkaryotic, 2007 
WL 1378345, at *4 (finding that “only a record holder . . . may claim and perfect appraisal rights”). 
Under Delaware law, both State Street and T. Rowe Price are considered to be beneficial owners. Dell 
Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 25. 
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both the federal and state level.47 At the federal level, to undo the effect of hav-
ing Cede as the largest stockholder on corporate ledgers, the SEC revised its 
definition of “record holder” to include banks and brokers while simultaneous-
ly prohibiting DTC and Cede from being classified as a record holder.48 This 
negated the quirk that Cede was the only listed record holder for many corpo-
rations, even though Cede’s name was actually the only name listed on stock 
ledgers.49 In other words, to reflect that Cede merely acted as an intermediary, 
the federal regulatory system recognized DTC participants—the banks and 
brokers with actual economic rights to the stock—as the stockholders of rec-
ord.50 
Delaware courts and legislators, however, declined to recognize the ef-
fects of the federally-mandated stock immobilization policy, incorrectly as-
suming that stockholders of Delaware corporations directly owned their 
shares.51 Unlike the federal system, Delaware did not carve out depositories 
from their definition of “record holders,” but rather failed to recognize that the 
intermediary system was not only required, but practically necessary to pre-
vent securities markets from drowning in paper.52 Delaware legislators were 
not blind to the intermediary ownership system; they simply decided to favor 
the confidence and consistency provided by reliance on stock ledgers rather 
than judicial determinations of beneficial ownership.53 Thus, Delaware contin-
                                                                                                                           
 47 Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02 n.6 (noting that the SEC reported that “85% of securi-
ties traded on exchanges” are not held by individual investors, but by “banks or brokers, the vast ma-
jority of which are deposited with DTC”) (citations omitted). 
 48 See Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *6 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c–1(i)) (noting that 
the SEC included custodial banks and brokers in the definition of record holders, defining depositories 
as “clearing agencies” and record holders as, “any broker, dealer, voting trustee, bank, association or 
other entity that exercises fiduciary powers which holds securities of record in nominee or name or 
otherwise or as a participant in a clearing agency”). 
 49 See id. (discussing how the SEC amended its rules to accommodate for an intermediary share 
ownership regime); see, e.g., Donald, supra note 22, at 65–67 (noting that “[t]he SEC seems to have 
realized [the] problem” posed to stock ledgers by the intermediary holding system, and discussing the 
SEC’s solution qua imposing proxy distribution requirements). 
 50 Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 29 (noting that DTC is not a record holder for the purposes of 
federal securities laws); Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *11 (same). 
 51 See Dell Ownership 2015 WL 3213206, at *18 (discussing Delaware law’s ignorance of the 
depository system); see also Laster, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the flaws in Delaware appraisal 
law, noting that Delaware law assumes incorrectly that shares are owned directly). Delaware was not 
the only state with this problem: generally, state corporate laws were drafted on the presumption that 
record ownership would hinge on the issuance of paper certificates and that the sale of shares in an 
issuing corporation would require those certificates to be returned to the issuing corporation and reis-
sued in the name of the purchaser. See HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A 
LAWYER’S GUIDE 41 (2011) (noting how state corporate laws were drafted based on assumptions that 
paper stock certificates would exchange hands). 
 52 See Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206 at *3 (discussing Delaware courts’ failure to distin-
guish “the voluntary relationship between a client and its custodial bank or broker . . . from the feder-
ally mandated relationship between the custodial bank or broker and the DTC”). 
 53 See id. at *18 (discussing the development of the record holder requirement in Delaware). 
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ued to look only to a corporation’s stock ledger to determine record owner-
ship.54 In reality, those who had an economic interest in the shares were rarely 
listed on a company’s ledger.55 As a result, Cede was (and is) habitually the 
largest record holder listed on the stock ledgers of publically traded Delaware 
corporations.56 Moreover, ownership barely ever shifted from Cede to another 
record holder, regardless of how many millions of trades occur among banks or 
brokers and investors.57 As described in Part I, Sections C and D, this failure 
created adverse consequences in appraisal litigation because the onus of per-
fecting the appraisal right rests solely with record holders.58 
B. An Overview of the Appraisal Remedy: History, Policy, & Trends 
Before the twentieth century, fundamental corporate transactions typically 
required the unanimous approval of stockholders.59 This regime created oppor-
tunities for minority stockholders to hold majorities hostage by arbitrarily ve-
toing certain transactions or demanding payment to go along with transac-
tions.60 As a result, many states abandoned the common law unanimity rule for 
a majority voting rule.61 In exchange for the loss of their veto power, many 
states concomitantly provided stockholders with the right to receive the judi-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 21 (affirming that Delaware appraisal law defines “stockhold-
er” as “a holder of record of stock in a corporation”); Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3 (find-
ing that Delaware courts continue to treat Cede as the holder of record and apply the continuous own-
ership requirement strictly). 
 55 See Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02 (discussing how Cede’s name appears on corpo-
rate ledgers, not the names of beneficial owners). 
 56 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *6. 
 57 See id. at *24 (noting how, through the use of Cede’s depository structure, “ownership does not 
change”). Delaware’s law is also inconsistent with itself. Laster, supra note 11, at 6. Although Dela-
ware corporate law assumes stockholders directly own their shares, Delaware’s securities law assumes 
that each stockholder owns a pro rata portion of the shares held by Cede. Id. In other words, Dela-
ware’s securities law, which mimics federal securities law, recognizes that stockholders own their 
shares indirectly through Cede, while the corporate law fails to follow suit. Id. 
 58 See notes 81–177 and accompanying text. 
 59 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3; Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 618–19. 
 60 See Salomon Bros., Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 576 A.2d 650, 651–52 (Del. Ch. 1989) 
(describing a minority shareholder’s ability to eke out a share premium through obstinance); see also 
William F. Looney, Jr, Dissenting Minority Stockholder’s Right of Appraisal, 4 B.C. L. REV. 85, 85 
(1962) (discussing the evolution of minority shareholders’ veto power under the unanimous share-
holder-approval regime). 
 61 In re Ancestry.Com, Inc. (Ancestry), 2015 WL 66825, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015); see MOD-
EL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 11.03(e), 12.02(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (requiring only majority approval 
for merger and sale of assets). Some states, like Massachusetts, required more than a simple majority 
for the transactions or decisions to proceed. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 78(c)(1)(iii) 
(2017) (“[T]he vote of two-thirds of the shares of each class of stock of each constituent corporation 
outstanding and entitled to vote on the question, or, if the articles of organization so provide, the vote 
of a lesser proportion but not less than a majority of each class of stock of each constituent corporation 
outstanding and entitled to vote on the question, shall be necessary for the approval of [a merger or 
consolidation].”). 
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cially-appraised fair value for their shares to prevent them from being harmed 
by a transaction they disfavored: the appraisal remedy.62 As time passed and 
shares became substantially more liquid by virtue of a growing securities mar-
ket, the policy goals behind appraisal shifted from a quid pro quo for the loss 
of veto power to protecting minority stockholders against a tyrannical or self-
serving majority.63 In this capacity, the appraisal remedy provides a shield to 
protect investments for stockholders who do not believe they are getting a fair 
bargain for their shares.64 Today, any merger or consolidation in Delaware in-
volving a shareholder vote provides an appraisal right.65 
Both academics and jurists typically disfavor the appraisal remedy due to 
its procedural barriers and substantive remedy.66 The procedural hurdles to 
seek appraisal are burdensome and costly,67 the costs of litigation are difficult 
to share across a class,68 and the remedy is limited to only the “fair value” of a 
stockholder’s shares at the time of the transaction.69 Despite these disad-
vantages, there has been a recent spike in appraisal litigation by a new class of 
investors: sophisticated and appraisal-focused arbitrageurs.70 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *4 (describing appraisal in its earlier forms as “a statutory 
means whereby the shareholder can avoid the conversion of his property into other property not of his 
choosing”); see also Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995) (describing 
appraisal as “a limited legislative remedy developed initially as a means to compensate stockholders 
of Delaware corporations for the loss of their common law right to prevent a merger or consolidation 
by refusal to consent to such transactions”). 
 63 See Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *4 (describing how appraisal evolved into a “defensive” 
mechanism against majority-shareholder oppression); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Ma-
jority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 13 (1995) (noting that the policy 
goals have shifted from a quid pro quo to protecting minority stockholders from majority stockholders 
with an interest in a given transaction); Craig Boyd, Note, Appraisal Arbitrage: Closing the Flood-
gates on Hedge Funds and Activist Stockholders, 65 KAN. L. REV. 497, 501 (2016) (same). 
 64 HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 61. 
 65 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2016). 
 66 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1560 (providing an overview of scholars’ generally 
negative attitudes towards appraisal); see, e.g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Reme-
dy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 260 (1962) (noting the limited circumstances for 
which the appraisal remedy would be useful). 
 67 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1561 (surveying leading casebooks that describe appraisal 
as “a cumbersome remedy” with a “complicated maze” of procedural hurdles) (citation omitted). 
 68 See id. (noting that the appraisal remedy is generally disfavored because of the difficulties in 
rallying together a class). 
 69 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (limiting plaintiffs to receiving the fair value of their 
shares); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc, 542 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Del. 1988) (finding “the only litigable 
issue” in an appraisal proceeding “is the determination of the value of the appraisal petitioners’ shares 
on the date of the merger . . . and the only relief available is a judgment against the surviving corpora-
tion for the fair value of the dissenters’ shares”); see also Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1561 
(describing that appraisal is a disfavored remedy because it is limited to the “fair value” of a stock-
holders’ shares). 
 70 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1568 (documenting the rise in appraisal litigation). 
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“Appraisal arbitrage” is an investment strategy where investors purchase 
stock in a corporation for the sole purpose of exercising appraisal rights.71 Ar-
bitrageurs are investors, often hedge funds,72 who purchase stock in a corpora-
tion after the record date for a shareholder meeting to approve a merger, but 
before the effective date of the merger.73 The record date is a moment in time 
in which a corporation’s stock ledger is assessed to determine which stock-
holders are entitled to both notice and voting rights for a particular transac-
tion.74 Scholars have debated the genesis of the recent increase in appraisal 
litigation.75 Some claim that the appraisal statute’s five percent above-market 
interest rate paid to appraisal plaintiffs is too generous, reducing the risk of 
seeking appraisal for arbitrageurs and making appraisal a more attractive vehi-
cle for investment.76 Others point to recent judicial decisions allowing inves-
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *23 (defining appraisal arbitrage). 
 72 Gaurav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage—Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71 BUS. 
LAW. 427, 428 (2016) (defining appraisal arbitrageurs as “hedge funds that seek transactions where 
the court-appraised value is likely to be higher than the transaction price”). One such investor is the 
notorious hedge fund owner Carl Icahn. See HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 64 (describing Mr. Icahn’s 
intention to use the appraisal mechanism in the going-private transaction of Dell, Inc. in 2013). Mr. 
Icahn made his intention to use the appraisal remedy as a profit-seeking tool, rather than to protect his 
investment, clear in an open letter to other Dell stockholders. Id. at 65 (“Throughout my career I have 
constantly been on the lookout for situations where risk is very negligible compared to the reward. I 
believe that today a ‘no brainer’ exists at Dell. This is because if you own Dell and opt for appraisal 
rights, you have a rare opportunity to make a profit without taking a risk.”). 
 73 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1566 (discussing arbitrageurs’ ability to purchase 
shares after the announcement of a merger); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (providing ap-
praisal rights to stockholders who hold their shares from “the date [they] mak[e] . . . a demand . . . 
through the effective date of the merger or consolidation”). 
 74 Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.05 (“The record date mechanism enables the issuer to 
ascertain who is entitled to vote, to print a proper number of proxy statements and proxy cards, and to 
disseminate them . . . .”); see Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 28 (discussing the policy behind setting a 
record date, noting that, “because shares are freely alienable by default, the identity of a corporation’s 
stockholder base is typically in flux[,] . . . [i]t is therefore necessary to define a specific population of 
stockholders who are entitled to receive notice of a meeting of stockholders and vote at the meeting”). 
Although not necessary, it is often common for arbitrageurs to purchase stock after the record date as 
it provides ample time to review proxy materials and make a determination on the viability of suc-
ceeding in obtaining a premium above the merger consideration in an appraisal action. Onyeador, 
supra note 11, at 345 n.29. 
 75 Compare Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1578–80 (arguing that neither the Transkaryotic 
decision nor the statutory interest rate have had significant effects on the rise of appraisal), with Tre-
vor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb Appraisal Arbitrage Abuses, CLS BLUE 
SKY BLOG (Feb. 10, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/02/10/delaware-legislature-
should-act-to-curb-appraisal-arbitrage-abuses [https://perma.cc/66WQ-L9HF] (claiming appraisal 
arbitrage was “spawned by Transkaryotic”). 
 76 Daniel E. Wolf et al., Appraisal Rights—The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?, HARVARD 
LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (May 16, 2013), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2013/05/16/appraisal-rights-the-next-frontier-in-deal-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/
DJT2-KME7] (commenting that the combination of a “ultra-low interest rate” environment, plus the 
statutory interest rate, presents “at least a meaningful offset to the extended period of illiquidity and 
litigation costs imposed on the dissenting stockholders for the duration of the proceedings”). 
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tors to exercise appraisal for shares purchased after the pool of voting-eligible 
stockholders has already been decided.77 Some commentators cast doubt on 
these factors as playing a pivotal role in the surge of appraisal litigation.78 In 
fact, some commentators propose that the rise in appraisal litigation is merely 
coincidental, arguing that some hedge fund got lucky and others wanted to rep-
licate that success.79 What commentators do agree on, however, is that allow-
ing stockholders to seek appraisal for shares purchased after the announcement 
of a merger created the conditions for such a surge of litigation to occur.80 As 
discussed in Section D, the ability to purchase shares after an announcement 
(more specifically, after the record date) flows as a natural consequence from 
the inconsistencies between Delaware appraisal law and realities about how 
securities are held.81 
C. The Delaware Appraisal Statute 
1. When Can a Stockholder Have Their Shares Appraised? 
Although the appraisal remedy has oft been considered absolute,82 only 
certain transactions trigger the right to demand it.83 Title 8, Section 262 of the 
General Delaware Corporation Law limits the appraisal remedy to mergers or 
consolidations on which stockholders vote.84 Delaware law does, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Compare Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1578–80 (arguing that neither the Transkaryotic 
decision nor the statutory interest rate have had significant effects on the rise of appraisal), with Nor-
witz, supra note 75 (claiming appraisal arbitrage was “spawned by Transkaryotic”). 
 78 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1578–80 (arguing that neither the Transkaryotic deci-
sion nor the statutory interest rate have had significant effects on appraisal filing). 
 79 See, e.g., id. at 1582 (proposing that the surge in appraisal litigation was mere happenstance). 
 80 Id. at 1566; Onyeador, supra note 11, at 349–50. 
 81 See infra notes 113–178 and accompanying text. 
 82 Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395 A.2d 369, 375 (Del. Ch. 1978) (noting the “clear” and “absolute” 
right of a dissenting stockholder to seek the appraisal remedy). Federal law, however, can preempt the 
state-granted right. See Bruno v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 498 A.2d 171, 174 (Del. Ch. 1985) (finding that 
Interstate Commerce Act preempted Delaware appraisal remedy for cash-out merger involving two 
railroads), aff’d, 508 A.2d 72 (Del. 1986). 
 83 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (permitting appraisal rights only in mergers or con-
solidations), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (providing appraisal 
rights in mergers, consolidations, sales of all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation, or 
where certain amendments are made to the articles of incorporation). Delaware does not subscribe to 
the de facto merger doctrine, where transactions that have the same effect of a merger—for example, 
sales of all assets—will afford stockholders appraisal rights. HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 54, 55. 
Rather, Delaware subscribes to the “equal dignity” doctrine, whereby each statute of the corporate law 
is given independent legal significance. See id. (“Delaware courts will not penalize boards of directors 
who comply with one provision of the statute and not another, and so will not apply the laws related to 
a merger to an asset sale (and vice versa).”). 
 84 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (“Appraisal rights shall be available for the shares of any class 
or series of stock of a constituent corporation in a merger or consolidation . . . ”); see HILL ET AL., 
supra note 7, at 63 (“Appraisal rights are only available if stockholders are dissenting from a statutory 
merger accomplished pursuant to any of [DGCL] §§ 251–258, 263–264, or 267. This includes short 
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permit corporations to amend their articles of incorporation to provide apprais-
al rights in a broader spectrum of occasions, including the sale of all or sub-
stantially all of the assets of the corporation or amendments to the articles of 
incorporation.85 
Delaware carves out an exception that precludes stockholders from de-
manding appraisal on any publicly traded shares, the “market-out” exception.86 
As an exception to that exception, however, a stockholder will be allowed to 
demand appraisal if the consideration for a merger is cash or anything other 
than stock of the surviving corporation or publically-traded stock of a third 
corporation.87 
2. How Can a Stockholder Have Their Shares Appraised? 
Once a merger has been announced, any stockholder can perfect their ap-
praisal rights by jumping through a series of procedural hoops.88 Section 262 
requires that a stockholder: (1) hold their stock on the date they make a de-
mand to the corporation to exercise their appraisal rights; (2) continuously hold 
their stock through the effective date of the merger; (3) otherwise comply with 
the form and time requirements of the statute; and (4) not vote in favor of the 
merger.89 
Section 262’s requirement that a stockholder not vote in favor of a merger 
is conveniently called the “dissenter” requirement.90 It is met when a stock-
                                                                                                                           
form mergers: the § 253 short form merger and the § 251(h) short form merger. Appraisal rights are 
also available in statutory mergers between Delaware entities and non-Delaware entities, and between 
a corporation and an entity other than a corporation, such as a Limited Liability Company (LLC)”). 
For simplicity, I will use the term “merger” to represent both mergers and consolidations under Sec-
tion 262 of the Delaware corporate law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262. 
 85 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c). 
 86 See id. § 262(b)(1) (preventing stockholders from exercising appraisal rights where: (1) the 
stock is listed on a national securities exchange, (2) is owned by more than 2,000 stockholders, or (3) 
the merger did not require shareholder approval); HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 73 (using the term 
“market out” to apply to conditions that satisfy DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1)). 
 87 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1559. For exam-
ple, suppose you own shares in XYZ Corp., a publically traded Delaware corporation. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 262. XYZ Corp. is to be merged with and into ABC Corp., a Delaware corporation with 
ABC as the surviving corporation and ABC will pay cash for your shares. Id. The statute grants you 
appraisal rights because the transaction is a statutory merger and requires a shareholder vote. Id. The 
statute then takes away your right to vote pursuant to the market-out exception because XYZ is publi-
cally traded. Id. The statute then restores your right to appraisal because you are receiving cash for 
your shares. Id. 
 88 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (providing exceptions to the appraisal right); § 262(d) (provid-
ing the steps necessary to perfect one’s appraisal rights). 
 89 Id. § 262(d)–(e). 
 90 Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 21. See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging 
Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227 (2008) (providing a complete description of how the 
intermediary ownership system intersects with voting procedures and proxy authorization). 
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holders either casts a “no” vote or abstains from voting.91 Section 262’s re-
quirement that a stockholder hold their shares from the date they make a writ-
ten demand through the effective date of the merger is referred to as the “con-
tinuous ownership” requirement.92 If even one of the above procedural steps is 
not satisfied, a stockholder may forfeit their appraisal rights.93 
3. Who Are Stockholders? 
Embedded in the procedural hurdles is the “record holder” requirement, 
which limits the perfection of appraisal to a “holder of record” or “record 
holder.”94 The Delaware appraisal statute does not define what it means to be a 
“holder of record,”95 but the term is interpreted by Delaware courts as stock-
holders that are listed on a corporation’s stock ledger.96 In the modern securi-
ties holding system, the record holder is usually not a party with an economic 
interest in the shares, but instead is DTC, the centralized depository, that holds 
all of an issuing corporation’s shares in an undifferentiated pool, assigning pro 
rata economic rights in those shares to banks and brokers who in turn assign 
those rights to investors.97 
It is important to note that, in Delaware, the onus of perfecting the ap-
praisal procedures rests only with the record holder, not the beneficial owner.98 
                                                                                                                           
 91 HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 68. 
 92 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *2. The effective date of the merger is the date that 
either a certificate of merger or merger agreement is filed with Delaware’s Secretary of State. DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c). 
 93 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g) (permitting the Court of Chancery to conduct a hearing to 
determine whether stockholders have “complied with this section and who have become entitled to 
appraisal rights”); HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 61 (noting that Delaware courts “require scrupulous 
adherence to the [appraisal] statute’s requirements in order to access the remedy”). 
 94 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (defining the word “stockholder” as “a holder of record of 
stock in a corporation and also a member of record of a nonstock corporation”). 
 95 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *8 (noting that “no other provision of the DGCL de-
fines what it means to be a ‘holder of record’”). 
 96 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 21 (defining “stockholder” as a holder of shares identified in 
the ownership records of a corporation); HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 62 (defining record stockholders 
as “those in whose name shares are held”). Being a record holder is synonymous with holding legal 
title of a share of stock, often evidenced by share certificates issued by a corporation in the name of 
the legal title holder. Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02. Record ownership provides a stock-
holder a gaggle of rights under Delaware law, including the right to vote, inspect a company’s records, 
and appraisal. Id. 
 97 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1. 
 98 See Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *5, *8 (affirming that the focus of the procedural inquiry is 
entirely on the record holder and that any actions by beneficial holders are irrelevant, reiterating that 
“[t]o be entitled to appraisal, the beneficial owner must ensure that the record holder of his or her 
shares makes the demand”) (citing Dirienzo v. Steel Partners Holdings L.P., 2009 WL 4652944, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2009)); Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3, *4 (finding that “the determinative 
record regarding compliance with § 262 requirements is that of the record holder”); see also Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 90, at 1233 (“Delaware corporate law [] puts record ownership, rather than benefi-
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Delaware law has consistently emphasized this requirement, and it is well-
settled that only the actions of the record holder are determinative of perfection 
in appraisal proceedings.99 Because Delaware only grants the right to perfect 
appraisal to record holders,100 and Cede is the largest and most common record 
holder, the onus of compliance with the appraisal statute rests with Cede to act 
as instructed by beneficial owners.101 This is where Delaware law and the fed-
eral system diverge—the federal system looks through Cede to determine who 
record holders are, whereas Delaware law only requires a superficial reference 
to a corporation’s stock ledger to identify stockholders of record.102 
Even so, once the notice, holding, and voting requirements of Section 
262(d) are met, Section 262(e) permits either the record holder or a beneficial 
owner to petition the Delaware Court of Chancery and bring an appraisal ac-
tion.103 Effectively, this provision permits individuals with an economic inter-
est in the shares to direct their record holder to seek appraisal on their be-
                                                                                                                           
cial ownership, at the center of the [voting] system. Firms are entitled to rely on the list of registered 
owners in determining who is entitled to vote.”). 
 99 Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *5, *8 (affirming that the focus of the procedural inquiry is en-
tirely on the record holder and that any actions by beneficial holders are irrelevant, reiterating that 
“[t]o be entitled to appraisal, the beneficial owner must ensure that the record holder of his or her 
shares makes the demand”). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 62 (describing that Cede, as record holder, holds all shares in 
street name on behalf of most beneficial owners, noting that, “because the record holder had to bring 
the action, the plaintiff in many appraisal cases was “Cede & Co.”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 
51, at 42 (“[T]he record holder technically entitled to vote huge quantities of a public corporation’s 
stock is Cede & Co.”). 
 102 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 21 (affirming that Delaware appraisal law defines “stock-
holder” as “a holder of record of stock in a corporation”); Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3 
(finding that Delaware courts continue to treat Cede as the holder of record and apply the continuous 
ownership requirement strictly); Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *4 (only requiring corporations 
to rely on their internal “records as the sole determinant of membership in the context of appraisal”). 
 103 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e); see, e.g., Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *5 (noting that the 
beneficial owner filed the appraisal petition in its own name after Cede, the record holder, perfected 
its appraisal rights). 
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half.104 For beneficial owners, the only way to ensure they are having their in-
terests protected is to direct Cede to perfect appraisal for them.105 
4. Machinations of Intrigue: Appraisal Rights Can Be Bought 
One quirk of the modern iteration of the appraisal statute is that appraisal 
rights are marketable.106 Shares can be purchased from record holders after the 
announcement of a merger (and even after the record date) and subsequent 
purchasers will retain the right to seek appraisal.107 Historically, Delaware 
courts have not taken a hostile stance to this practice.108 Yet, this quirk has 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See Onyeador, supra note 11, at 345 (discussing Section 262(e), noting how non-record hold-
ers can pursue standing on their own); see also Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 51 (relaying the Ancestry 
decision’s discussion of Section 262(e), noting that, “the statutory amendment was intended to simpli-
fy the procedure for pursuing appraisal and not to effect substantive change”). When a beneficial 
owner seeks appraisal, DTC will remove from its fungible bulk an amount of shares sufficient to cov-
er the beneficial owner’s demand from the FAST account by having the issuing company deliver a 
separate stock certificate in Cede’s name. Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3. Generally, un-
less a participant pays for the service, DTC does not hold physical stock certificates of its participants. 
Id. at *7. Thus, when issued a stock certificate and a participant does not contract for the vault service, 
DTC sends the certificates to the participants themselves. See id. (describing that, because neither JP 
Morgan nor Bank of New York Mellon participated in the vault service, upon issuance of new stock 
certificates by Dell, DTC had them sent to the banks’ own custodians for safe-keeping). 
 105 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *7. Beneficial owners can submit votes through proxy 
and petition the court by themselves. Id. But this system is not perfect: human error at the depository 
level can force beneficial owners to lose their rights to appraisal for no good reason. See Laster, supra 
note 11, at 10 (discussing Dell Dissenters, noting that, “this case shows how complexity breeds . . . 
mistakes”). 
 106 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 10, at 1554 (discussing the ability to buy and sell appraisal 
rights through shares of stock, noting that “a stockholder need not own the stock on the date the chal-
lenged merger is announced”); see, e.g., BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *6 (finding petitioners 
met the standing requirements of Section 262 where petitioners purchased legal title to shares after the 
record date and otherwise complied with Section 262(d)); see also HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 67 
(“The language of the statute permits beneficial holders to purchase shares of the target after an-
nouncement of the merger and then pursue an appraisal.”). 
 107 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 36 (discussing prior cases where stockholders were allowed 
buy shares after the record date and seek appraisal for those shares). A post-record date purchaser of 
shares cannot vote with the shares they purchased—only the record holder as of the record date can 
vote. Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.05 (“The post-record date purchaser, however, is not the 
legal owner as of the record date and is not permitted to vote this stock directly even if no vote or 
proxy is ultimately presented by the record owner.”). Because not voting “yes” is a requirement to 
seek appraisal, defendants in appraisal actions often claim that appraisal-seeking stockholders must 
prove that the particular shares they purchased after the record date were not voted in favor of the 
merger. See, e.g., BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *4 (noting defendant corporation argued to 
impose a requirement where appraisal-seeking plaintiffs would have to prove their particular shares 
were not voted in favor of the merger). 
 108 See, e.g., BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *6 (“Section 262 permits the existence of ap-
praisal arbitrage by allowing investors to petition for appraisal of stock purchased after a merger is 
announced.”); Salomon Bros, 576 A.2d at 654 (finding “nothing inequitable about an investor pur-
chasing stock in a company after a merger has been announced with the thought that, if the merger is 
consummated on the announced terms, the investor may seek appraisal”). 
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opened the floodgates for appraisal litigation abuse by profit-seeking arbitra-
geurs.109 
Investors may purchase appraisal-eligible shares after a merger is an-
nounced because the statute only requires a record holder to hold their shares 
from the date they make a written demand through the effective date of the 
merger.110 In other words, there is no requirement that the stockholder seeking 
appraisal be the record holder on the record date.111 In fact, as discussed below 
in Section D of Part I, recent decisions have held that neither beneficial owners 
nor record holders that purchase after the record date are barred from exercis-
ing appraisal.112 
D. DTC/Cede Creates a Bulk of Problems 
Cede is an intermediary with no economic stake in the shares that it 
holds.113 Nevertheless, because its name is listed on the ledger of a Delaware 
corporation, it bears the burdens and rights of a holder of full legal title.114 The 
only way to ensure beneficial owners’ interests are protected is to direct Cede 
to perfect appraisal on their behalf.115 This means that beneficial owners must 
instruct Cede not to vote in favor of the transaction,116 make a demand on the 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See HILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 67 (describing the ability to perfect appraisal with shares 
purchased after the announcement of a merger as a “loophole” which has “created an avenue for arbi-
trageurs to buy shares and then pursue appraisal actions when they believe the announced deal values 
justify the investment”). 
 110 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (providing appraisal rights to stockholders who hold their 
shares from “the date [they] mak[e] . . . a demand . . . through the effective date of the merger or con-
solidation”); see, e.g., BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *8 (finding post-record date purchasing 
record holder met the procedural requirements of Section 262 where petitioner made a demand after 
purchase, voted against the transaction, and continued to hold shared through the effective merger 
date). 
 111 See BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *6 (describing stockholders’ abilities to seek appraisal 
with shares purchased after the announcement of a merger). See generally Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 
1378345 (finding beneficial owner plaintiffs not disqualified from pursuing standing where they pur-
chased shares after the record date). 
 112 See, e.g., BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *8 (finding record holders that purchased after 
the record date entitled to pursue appraisal rights); Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5 (finding 
beneficial owners that purchased after the record date entitled to pursue appraisal rights). 
 113 Reder & Onyeador, supra note 41, at 281–82; Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02. 
 114 Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.02. 
 115 See, e.g., Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *7 (finding that stockholders in a public 
corporation had to direct Cede to “demand appraisal on their behalf”). Beneficial owners can submit 
votes through proxy and petition the court by themselves. Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.03. 
But this system is not perfect: human error at the depository level can force beneficial owners to lose 
their rights to appraisal for no good reason. See Laster, supra note 11, at 10 (discussing Dell Dissent-
ers, noting that, “this case shows how complexity breeds . . . mistakes”). 
 116 See, e.g., Dell Dissenters 143 A.3d at 59 (denying standing for appraisal where Cede, the 
record holder, mistakenly voted beneficial owner-petitioners’ shares in favor of the merger); see also 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1233 (discussing, in the voting context, Delaware courts look to 
record owners to determine how votes are cast, but recognize that “record owners may authorize oth-
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corporation, and continuously hold shares from the date of the demand until 
the effective date of the merger.117 Too often, however, errors created by un-
necessary intermediary steps involving Cede have determined the outcome of 
appraisal proceedings.118 
1. Fungible Bulk and the Dissenter Requirement 
One of the problems presented by Cede’s ownership structure is that it is 
impossible to identify the specific shares beneficial holders own in Cede’s fun-
gible bulk.119 Cede does not assign actual, individual shares to its participants, 
but rather assigns a pro rata stake in the fungible bulk to banks and brokers.120 
Thus, banks and brokers (and their beneficial-owner clients) cannot point to a 
specific share and claim it as theirs—they merely own an unidentifiable por-
tion of the whole.121 But, to perfect and seek appraisal for a given share, a 
stockholder (record holder) must not vote in favor of the merger with the 
shares they seek to have appraised.122 This dissonance has effectively forced 
                                                                                                                           
ers to vote in their stead by means of a proxy”). Cede votes through a chain of proxy authorizations 
beginning with Cede and ending with beneficial owners. Kahan & Rock, supra note 90, at 1243. First, 
issuing corporations will query DTC for a list of DTC participants holding the issuing corporation’s 
securities (the Cede breakdown). Id. Then, the issuing corporation will reach out to the DTC partici-
pants (banks and brokers) and query how many proxies will need to be issued to the participants’ 
clients (the beneficial holders) for the upcoming vote. Id. at 1244. The issuing corporations then deliv-
ers the proxy materials to its participating banks and brokers (or to the banks and brokers’ third-party 
proxy processing company, typically Broadridge Financial Services, Inc. (“Broadridge”)). Id. at 1244, 
1246. The banks and brokers (or Broadridge) then deliver the proxy materials to the beneficial owners 
by mail or electronically. Id. at 1246. To authorize voting, Cede must first issue an “omnibus” or gen-
eral proxy to all of its participating banks and brokers, who in turn further issue omnibus proxies 
down the chain of ownership to beneficial owners. Id. at 1247. 
 117 See, e.g., Dell Ownership., 2015 WL 4313206, at *9 (denying standing for petitioners where, 
after petitioners caused Cede to demand appraisal, Cede transferred legal title to petitioners’ transfer 
agent’s nominee’s). 
 118 See, e.g., Dell Dissenters 143 A.3d at 59 (denying standing for appraisal where Cede, the 
record holder, mistakenly voted beneficial owner-petitioners’ shares in favor of the merger); Dell 
Ownership., 2015 WL 4313206, at *9 (denying standing for petitioners where, after petitioners caused 
Cede to demand appraisal, Cede transferred title to petitioners’ custodial bank). 
 119 See Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *5 (reiterating the finding in Transkaryotic, that Cede’s 
aggregate holding cannot be “traced” to any “specific shares”). 
 120 See Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1–2 (discussing the mechanics of Cede’s fungible 
bulk holding structure). 
 121 Id. 
 122 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262; Reynolds Metals Co. v. Colonial Realty Corp., 190 A.2d 
752, 753 (Del. 1963) (finding that, “the sole question in the case” was “whether the vote in favor of 
the merger cast by the broker as the registered holder of certain shares makes the broker ineligible . . . 
to demand appraisal in respect of other shares”) (emphasis added); Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 44 
(finding that precedent supported that appraisal-seeking stockholders must show that the “specific 
shares” for which appraisal is sought were not voted in favor of the transaction, while only requiring 
plaintiffs bring forth evidence that Cede owned enough appraisal-eligible shares to cover stockhold-
ers’ demands). But see BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *4 (“Noticeably absent from [Section 262] 
is an explicit requirement that the stockholder seeking appraisal prove that the specific shares it seeks 
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the Delaware Court of Chancery to lift stockholders’ burdens of proving that 
the particular share for which they seek appraisal was not voted in favor of the 
merger.123 In other words, courts no longer require plaintiffs to trace their 
shares back to any particular vote.124 
The rationale is this: to vote, a stockholder must be a record holder on the 
record date.125 Inconsistently, a stockholder does not have to be a record holder 
on the record date to seek appraisal.126 Strangely, if a record holder sells their 
share after the record date, but before their vote is counted, they would lose 
their right to appraisal on that share, but retain their right to vote.127 Subse-
quent purchasers, however, may still exercise appraisal rights for those shares 
even though they have no vote.128 To have their shares appraised, stockholders 
who purchase after the record date would have to show that the previous own-
er—the record holder who retained the right to vote—did not vote in favor of 
the transaction with the share for which the subsequent stockholder is seeking 
appraisal.129 Because a stockholder cannot point to any specific share in Cede’s 
fungible bulk, however, this requirement is virtually impossible to meet, even 
for stockholders of record on the record date.130 
                                                                                                                           
to have appraised were not voted in favor of the merger.”). There is an obvious discrepancy in Dela-
ware appraisal law concerning whether there is or is not a share-tracing requirement. Compare Reyn-
olds Metals Co., 190 A.2d at 753 (imposing a share tracing requirement before the intermediary hold-
ing system was implemented), and Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 44 (reviewing cases before Tran-
skaryotic and finding a share tracing requirement before the imposition of DTC and Cede), with BMC 
Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *4 (explicitly rejecting a share-tracing requirement, considering the 
effects of the intermediary holding system on plaintiff’s ability to meet a share-tracing requirement). 
Recent case law seems to reject imposing a share-tracing requirement on stockholders. See Dell Dis-
senters, 143 A.3d at 44 (affirming that recent decisions have not required stockholders to trace their 
shares to particular votes); BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *4. Although beyond the scope of this 
Note, it does appear odd that courts began to notice and reject the share tracing requirement only after 
the intermediary holding system was implemented and stockholders began to argue the impossibility 
of tracing shares to particular votes through Cede. See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 44 (discussing 
recent appraisal cases involving arbitrageurs, noting that these cases developed a lack of share-tracing 
requirement after considering the negative effects the intermediary system had on stockholders’ abili-
ties to meet their dissenter requirement burden). 
 123 See, e.g., Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5 (declining to implement a requirement 
whereby plaintiffs would have to prove their specific shares, purchased after the record date, were not 
voted in favor of the merger). 
 124 Id.; see also Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *5–6 (refusing to impose a share-tracing require-
ment on stockholders); BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *4 (same). 
 125 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219. 
 126 Id. § 262(a). 
 127 Id. § 262. 
 128 See id.; see, e.g., Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1, *5 (permitting beneficial owner-
purchasers of stock after the record date to pursue appraisal). 
 129 BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *3 (discussing defendant’s contention that plaintiffs must 
put forward proof that their shares were not voted in favor of the merger by Cede). 
 130 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 37 (summarizing the holdings of Transkaryotic, Ancestry, 
and BMC Software as not imposing a share-tracing requirement because “investors who held on the 
record date [or purchased after the record date] would not be able to prove how Cede voted the shares 
2019] Blockchains, Distributed Ledgers, and Appraisal Rights 643 
The difficulty presented by the fungible bulk was first considered in 2007 
by the Delaware Court of Chancery in In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Thera-
pies, Inc.131 In Transkaryotic, hedge funds sought appraisal of over ten million 
shares, roughly eight million of which were purchased after the record date, 
but before the date of the shareholder vote.132 Cede was the holder of record 
for all relevant shares purchased by the hedge funds.133 The issue was whether 
a beneficial owner (the hedge funds), who bought their shares after the record 
date, had to prove that each share for which it sought appraisal was not voted 
in favor of the transaction by a previous beneficial owner.134 The court held 
that the petitioners did not have to prove how their shares were voted by a pre-
vious beneficial owner because only Cede, the record holder, could cast votes, 
so its actions were outcome-determinative.135 Moreover, when the court looked 
into how Cede cast its votes, it did not attempt to trace plaintiff’s shares to any 
particular share voted by Cede.136 Instead, the court found it sufficient that 
Cede voted against the merger or withheld a vote with a sum of shares suffi-
cient to cover the amount of shares for which the hedge funds sought apprais-
al.137 
                                                                                                                           
for which appraisal was sought” in virtue of Cede’s ownership structure); see also BMC Software, 
2015 WL 67586, at *4 (finding plaintiffs have standing to pursue appraisal on shares purchased after 
the record date without having to prove those shares were not voted in favor of the merger because 
there does not exist “any language in the statute . . . that the stockholder seeking appraisal prove that 
the specific shares it seeks to have appraised were not voted for the merger”). But see Dell Dissenters, 
143 A.3d at 56 (finding sufficient evidence extrinsic to DTC’s records to determine how plaintiffs’ 
shares were voted). A clean solution to this bizarre outcome would be to amend the appraisal statute to 
withhold appraisal rights from stockholders who purchase shares after the announcement of a merger. 
See Boyd, supra note 63, at 520–22 (discussing the benefits and pitfalls of denying appraisal to those 
purchasing shares after the record date). See generally Boyd, supra note 63, at 520–22 (providing a 
more complete discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of limiting appraisal to shareholders as of the 
record date); Onyeador, supra note 11, at 375–76 (same). 
 131 See generally Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at *3. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3. In fact, both parties agreed that it would have been 
impossible to determine whether a specific share was voted for or against a merger. Id. at *2 (noting 
that stockholders could not prove their shares were not voted in favor of the merger, and the defendant 
corporation agreed that there existed “no proof that those specific shares are the shares petitioners 
hold”). 
 137 Id. at *4. In total, Cede held 29,720,074 shares of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. Id. at *1. Cede 
voted 12,882,000 in favor of the merger, 9,888,663 against it, and abstained 6,949,411 shares. Id. In 
other words, 16,838,074 shares were eligible for appraisal. Id. at *4. Petitioners sought appraisal on 
10,972,650 shares. Id. The court found it sufficient that Cede perfected appraisal rights for roughly 
sixteen million shares because it covered the ten million upon which petitioners sought appraisal. Id. 
The court, although it considered the fungible bulk structure, came to its decision by relying on prin-
ciples of strict statutory construction and declined to opine on the impossibility of tracing shares under 
the intermediary system. Id. 
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Decisions following Transkaryotic echoed these same principles.138 In 
2015, in both Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc. and In re Ances-
try.com, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that petitioners did not have to 
trace their shares back to any particular previous owner to prove that the shares 
were not voted in favor of the merger.139 In both cases, the court considered 
Cede’s fungible bulk ownership structure in coming to its decision.140 The 
stockholders in BMC Software even argued that pro rata beneficial ownership 
prevented a shareholder from identifying how any actual share was voted by a 
record owner.141 
BMC Software took the precedent a step further by applying the Tran-
skaryotic rule to a situation where the appraisal-seeking petitioner was a post-
record date purchasing record holder, as opposed to the beneficial owner in 
Transkaryotic that purchased their shares after the record date.142 In BMC 
Software, appraisal-seeking stockholders attempted to have their broker in-
struct Cede to seek appraisal on their behalf.143 Because of a change in the 
broker’s internal policies, the broker rejected the stockholders’ requests.144 
Thus, to seek appraisal, the stockholders were left with one option: to become 
record holders by withdrawing their stock from Cede’s fungible bulk and regis-
tering their stock directly with the issuing corporation in their own name.145 
The stockholders did just that and then attempted to seek appraisal by fulfilling 
all of the other procedural requirements of section 262.146 The court, ruling for 
the stockholders, declined to impose a share-tracing requirement, leaning heav-
ily on the Transkaryotic decision to conclude that section 262 only requires 
appraisal-seeking stockholders to show that the record holder held enough 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See generally BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586; Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825. 
 139 See BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *4 (“Noticeably absent from [Section 262(a)], or any 
language in the statute, is an explicit requirement that the stockholder seeking appraisal prove that the 
specific shares it seeks to have appraised were not voted in favor of the merger.”); Ancestry, 2015 WL 
66825, at *7 (finding that plaintiffs need not put forward evidence of how their shares were voted so 
long as Cede held a sufficient number of appraisal-eligible votes to “cover” the stockholders’ de-
mand). 
 140 See BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *5 (affirming the Transkaryotic court’s consideration 
of inability to trace votes back to shares in virtue of Cede’s ownership structure); Ancestry, 2015 WL 
66825, at *5–6 (same). 
 141 See BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *5 (discussing the holding from Transkaryotic and 
noting the “difficulties of tracing votes to specific shares due to the reality of modern securities prac-
tice[s]”). Similar to the Transkaryotic decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery considered that 
Cede’s fungible bulk made it impossible to trace shares, but rationalized its holdings on strict statutory 
construction. See id. at *4 (“Noticeably absent from [Section 262(a)], or any language in the statute, is 
an explicit requirement that the stockholder seeking appraisal prove that the specific shares it seeks to 
have appraised were not voted in favor of the merger.”). 
 142 See generally BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586. 
 143 Id. at *2. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at *6 (concluding, “[the stockholders] ha[ve] otherwise complied with . . . Section 262”). 
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shares not voted in favor of the merger to meet the appraisal demand.147 After 
BMC Software, regardless of whether a stockholder buys legal title or econom-
ic rights to stock before or after the record date, they can exercise appraisal 
without having to prove that your shares were not voted in favor of the mer-
ger.148 
Delaware courts have uniformly agreed that if petitioners were burdened 
with a requirement that forced them to produce evidence that their specific 
shares were not voted for the merger, then no stockholder, even those who 
purchased before and held on the record date, would ever be able to success-
fully seek appraisal.149 Thus, to salvage Section 262 from its own absurdity, 
petitioners must only show that Cede voted against a transaction or abstained 
from voting with enough shares to cover the amount of shares petitioners are 
seeking to have appraised.150 
As a caveat, where evidence does exist of how Cede voted particular 
shares, corporations may use that evidence defensively and preclude petition-
ers from exercising appraisal rights if it turns out their shares in fact voted in 
favor of the transaction.151 The lack of a share-tracing requirement was quali-
fied in 2016 by the Delaware Court of Chancery in Dell Dissenters.152 There, 
the court found that, although Transkaryotic, Ancestry, and BMC Software 
were good law, their outcomes and holdings were dictated by evidentiary defi-
ciencies in the fungible bulk system.153 Essentially, none of the previous deci-
sions were faced with a situation where evidence actually existed to support a 
finding of how Cede voted certain shares.154 When presented actual records 
generated by proxy-management companies about how certain shares were 
voted, the court seized the opportunity to create a burden-shifting rule for de-
termining whether the dissenter requirement had been met.155 
This burden-shifting rule did not implement a share-tracing require-
ment.156 It merely provided corporations with a defense against appraisal-
                                                                                                                           
 147 Id. 
 148 See id. at *4. 
 149 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 36–37 (discussing the consistent holdings of Transkaryotic, 
Ancestry, and BMC Software). 
 150 See, e.g., Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *1, *5 (finding that plaintiffs need not put forward 
evidence of how their shares were voted so long as Cede held enough appraisal-eligible shares to 
“cover” the stockholders’ appraisal demands). 
 151 Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 53–54 (describing the burden-shifting analysis where evidence of 
voting exists). 
 152 See id. (discussing defendant corporations’ ability to put forth evidence that plaintiff stock-
holders voted their shares in favor of the merger). 
 153 See id. at 37, 52 (distinguishing petitioner’s case from the appraisal arbitrage cases in virtue of 
the existence of evidence of how Cede voted certain shares). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 53. 
 156 Id. at 52. 
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petitioners where evidence existed that the petitioner’s shares were actually 
voted in favor of the merger.157 The rule operates as follows: because petition-
ers bear the burden of compliance with Section 262,158 they first must establish 
a prima facie case that the dissenter requirement had been met by showing that 
Cede held sufficient shares not voted for the merger or abstaining from the 
merger to cover the stockholders’ appraisal demands.159 Then, the burden shifts 
to the corporation to provide evidence that Cede actually voted the shares for 
which appraisal is sought in favor of the transaction.160 If the corporation can 
meet its burden, the dissenter requirement is not met, and the petitioner does 
not have standing to seek appraisal.161 
2. Extra Steps Create Room for Error: The Continuous Ownership 
Requirement 
Another complication caused by Cede concerns the continuous ownership 
requirement.162 Section 262 requires that a stockholder hold their shares from 
the date they make a written demand on a defendant corporation through the 
effective date of the merger.163 When a beneficial owner wants to seek apprais-
                                                                                                                           
 157 See id. at 53–54 (providing corporations with a burden to defeat petitioners’ standing by intro-
ducing proof establishing how a previous holder of record on the record date voted the shares). 
 158 See id. at 53 (discussing that an appraisal petitioner must establish a prima facie case that 
dissenter requirement had been met). Technically, Cede bears the burden of compliance. See Tran-
skaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345 at *3–4 (finding that “the determinative record regarding compliance 
with § 262 requirements is that of the record holder”). Once a petitioner brings a suit, however, they 
have the burden to prove that Cede complied with Section 262. See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 53 
(finding that “an appraisal petitioner that held in street name can establish a prima facie case that the 
dissenter requirement had been met by showing that there were sufficient shares at Cede that were not 
voted in favor of the merger to cover the appraisal class”). 
 159 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 52. This analysis is completely consistent with existing law. 
See Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3–4 (holding that only the actions of the record holder are 
relevant to perfecting appraisal). Because only Cede’s actions are relevant, the only way to meet the 
dissenter requirement is to prove that Cede voted a number of shares sufficient to cover the stockhold-
ers’ appraisal demands. Id. Otherwise, in virtue of Cede’s fungible bulk, it would be impossible (or at 
least impracticable) to meet the dissenter requirement. Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 53. 
 160 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 53. The court found that the corporation can do this by using 
publically available documents, like a Form N-PX, or other internal documents. Id. In the case of 
mutual funds, N-PX forms must be filed, disclosing how the mutual funds voted their securities. Id. at 
34. Thus, information concerning how appraisal-seeking mutual funds voted their securities is public-
ly available and readily ascertainable. See id. at 53. 
 161 Id. at 54. This is a very powerful defense mechanism if applied appropriately: it prevents 
stockholders from receiving the five percent above-market statutory interest because it disqualifies 
petitioners at the standing level. See Laster, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing that, in Dell Ownership, 
because petitioners did not have “standing to seek appraisal, they received no interest for the capital 
represented by their shares”). 
 162 See generally Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206 (denying plaintiff’s standing where a mis-
communication between Cede and plaintiff’s custodial banks caused Cede to register shares in the 
custodial banks’ name, defeating the continuous ownership requirement). 
 163 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a). 
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al, DTC removes a number of shares from the FAST account fungible bulk to 
cover the demand.164 DTC has the issuing corporation issue a new stock certif-
icate for the number of shares in Cede’s name, thus complying with the con-
tinuous ownership requirement because Cede maintained ownership of the 
stock at all times.165 This process is not foolproof, however; having Cede re-
move stocks from its fungible bulk and re-title them leaves room for error 
when those re-titled stocks must be delivered to beneficial owners’ banks for 
safekeeping.166 
In 2015, in Dell Ownership, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that 
stockholders failed to meet the continuous ownership requirement because 
Cede transferred legal title to the stockholders’ custodial banks.167 In Dell 
Ownership, beneficial stockholders sought appraisal and notified Cede of their 
desire to do so.168 DTC removed a number of shares from its FAST account to 
cover the demand and subsequently contacted Dell to have it issue new stock 
certificates in Cede’s name.169 Because the stockholders did not have a vault at 
DTC, DTC delivered the newly issued certificates to the beneficial stockhold-
ers’ custodial banks for safekeeping, but without the stockholders’ knowledge 
or consent.170 The problem arose when the custodial banks received the newly-
issued shares.171 Due to an internal policy at the custodial banks, the banks 
refused to hold the stock certificates unless the shares were in their own name, 
or in a name of their own nominees.172 The banks thus directed Cede to have 
Dell’s transfer agent re-title the shares in the names of the banks’ nominee.173 
The court found this to be a break in the chain of ownership, even though the 
transfer was without the consent of the beneficial owners.174 Vice-Chancellor 
Laster reasoned that the onus of compliance with Section 262(a) and (d) rested 
with Cede and that the appraisal statutes should be construed strictly.175 The 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See, e.g., Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *7 (finding that Cede moved stockholders’ 
shares from the FAST account upon request). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Laster, supra note 11, at 7 (“[C]omplexities of the nominee system harmed stockholders”). 
 167 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at *7. 
 171 Id. at *9. 
 172 Id. at *7 (noting that for ordinary business reasons, like insurance, internal recordkeeping, and 
theft mitigation, some banks and brokers refuse to hold certificates issued in another’s name). 
 173 Id. at *7. 
 174 Id. at *9 (“The re-titling of a certified share after the demand but before the effective date 
violates the [continuous ownership requirement] by causing record ownership to change.”) (citing 
Nelson v. Frank E. Best Inc., 768 A.2d 473, 477 (Del. Ch. 2000)). 
 175 Id. at *10. Because Delaware views the depository relationship as a voluntary one, the transfer 
was also considered voluntary, not a necessary part of the indirect holding system. Id. 
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record holder had changed, thus the beneficial owners failed to meet the con-
tinuous ownership requirement.176 
In a later speech, Vice-Chancellor Laster noted that the result, although 
unfortunate, was one he was forced to make.177 Vice-Chancellor Laster noted 
that this result was one of many problems caused by the intermediary system, 
but that blockchain technology and distributed ledgers could cleanly resolve 
these issues by cutting out Cede, thus dissolving the distinction between bene-
ficial owners and record holders.178 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Id. at *9. Vice-Chancellor Laster commented on this inadvertent loss of appraisal, noting that 
the failure of Delaware law to recognize DTC participants as holders of record was determinative. Id.; 
see Laster, supra note 11, at 6–7 (commenting how Vice-Chancellor Laster was “[c]onstrained by the 
law” in the Dell Ownership case and was forced to deny standing to petitioners). Had the custodial 
banks been record holders in the first instance, the transfer by Cede would not have violated the con-
tinuous ownership requirement. Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *11. To make matters worse, 
not only were stockholders left without standing to seek the upside of appraisal, but, without standing, 
they could not accrue the five percent above-market statutory interest while their investments were 
locked-in for two years. Id. 
 177 Laster, supra note 11, at 7. (He commented, “Personally, I think [the result] is absurd. [The 
actions by plaintiffs] was an example of people doing what they should do and then getting caught up 
by the system.”). 
 178 Id. at 16. It is worth discussing that Cede creates complications in areas beyond appraisal. See, 
e.g., Dole, 2017 WL 624842, at *4 n.1 (discussing the inherent difficulties of a beneficial holder secu-
rities regime). In 2017, in In re Dole Food Company, Inc., DTC’s slow and antiquated clearing system 
made it virtually impossible to determine which shares had actual claims to a settlement-entitled class 
remedy, forcing the Delaware Court of Chancery to rely on Cede’s electronic records to distribute 
proceeds to DTC participants. See id. at *7 (opining that the litany of issues facing appraisal-seeking 
dissenters “appear endemic” to DTC’s share ownership structure). In Dole, the class challenging the 
litigation comprised of roughly 36.8 million shares. Id. at *1. At the time of settlement, however, 49 
million shares had facially-valid claims to the disbursement. Id. There existed 54,084,157 shares unaf-
filiated with the defendant corporation at the time the class was created. Id. Of those, 17,290,399 were 
petitioners filing for appraisal, leaving 36,793,758 shares left to comprise the class. Id. The discrepan-
cy stemmed from the practice of settling stock trades within three business days from the time a trade 
is executed. Id. at *3. During this three-day window, securities fly through the balance sheets of sev-
eral intermediaries: internally through brokers’ accounts, externally between brokers, and externally 
between brokers and banks. Id.; Brian Patrick Eha, You Don’t Really Own Your Securities; Can 
Blockchain Fix That?, AM. BANKER (July 27, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/you-
dont-really-own-your-securities-can-blockchains-fix-that [https://perma.cc/G8SQ-XPV5] (“Within the 
three-day period required for securities transactions to settle, those securities travel through the bal-
ance sheets of multiple intermediaries.”). Even though Cede put a one-day freeze on trading Dole’s 
stock to determine the stockholders of record, two previous days of trading still had not settled. Dole, 
2017 WL 624842, at *3. In other words, at the effective time of the merger, DTC’s ledger did not 
reflect all of the trades for the prior two days. Id. This, in turn, allowed for multiple owners to submit 
claims for settlement based on shares involved in trades that did not clear: DTC participants whose 
names were listed on the ledger could submit claims as well as the clients of the participants that ac-
quired the shares. Id. Moreover, short sales enabled both borrowers of shares and lenders of shares to 
have submit valid claims for merger consideration from the same shares. Id. (“The shorting resulted in 
additional beneficial owners who received the merger consideration, who fell within the technical 
language of the class definition, and who could claim the settlement consideration. Meanwhile, the 
lenders of the shares . . . also could claim the settlement consideration.”). A short sale involves sellers 
borrowing shares from another stockholder and selling them (hopefully at a high price). Elvis Picardo, 
What Is Short Selling?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 1, 2017) https://www.investopedia.com/university/
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II. THE BLOCKCHAIN SOLUTION 
From tech savvy academics, to financial institutions, to the average inves-
tor, discussions about blockchain technology are nearly unavoidable.179 Block-
chain technology is intertwined with bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, and 
although they are often conflated, they are completely different concepts.180 
This Note focuses on the network and technology underlying bitcoin and cryp-
tocurrencies, rather than the cryptocurrencies themselves.181 Even though it is 
valuable, bitcoin is not, in and of itself, the solution to the beneficial ownership 
problems in the securities market.182 Bitcoin does, however, provide an apt 
analogy to how securities issued via blockchain might be traded, cleared, and 
settled because, like a share of stock that would be coded onto a blockchain, 
bitcoin is merely a string of code that amounts to an asset.183 Thus, this Part 
will reference bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to aid in painting a picture of 
                                                                                                                           
shortselling/shortselling1.asp [https://perma.cc/5VHY-4JY7]. The borrower of the stock only returns 
the shares once they are repurchased (at hopefully a lower price) and the position closes. Id. The short 
seller keeps the difference between the high price at which the borrowed shares were sold and the low 
price at which shares were repurchased as gain. Id. Vice-Chancellor Laster traced the genesis of the 
problem to be the DTC intermediary ownership system. Dole, 2017 WL 624842, at *3. The DTC 
system unfortunately requires participants and their broker customers to continuously net stock trans-
fers and report the trades back to DTC. Id. Because of the one-day freeze that DTC put on Dole, 
DTC’s centralized ledger did not accurately reflect all of the trades from the two days leading up to 
the merger closing. Id. To obtain that data would mean compiling information from over 800 DTC 
participants and potentially even the individual banks of the participants. Id. The Court recognized 
that determining the actual ownership of the shares would require a colossal forensic analysis, one 
which would yield uncertainty and be unduly burdensome. Id. (noting the functionally insurmountable 
challenge of sorting through the share discrepancy). 
 179 William Gayde, As Blockchain Technology Becomes More Popular, It Could Change the 
Digital World, TECHSPOT (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.techspot.com/news/71124-blockchain-
becomes-more-popular-what-does-mean-world.html [https://perma.cc/4JVM-NMLE] (noting the 
increasing popularity and incidences of discussions about blockchain technology); Why Blockchain Is 
Growing in Popularity, IOTCORESOFT (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.iotcoresoft.com/iot-knowlegde-
center/why-blockchain-is-growing-in-popularity [https://perma.cc/VX9A-K3G5] (compiling articles 
and surveys that “forecast” the potential uses of blockchain technology, including reducing bank in-
frastructure costs); see Blockchain 101, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that blockchain technology is the 
“hot new topic” across various industries). 
 180 See Piazza, supra note 3, at 274 (noting that blockchain technology and bitcoin, the cryptocur-
rency, are often conflated). 
 181 See supra note 1 (describing the scope of this Note). 
 182 See Piazza, supra note 3, at 274 (noting that, unlike bitcoin, distributed ledgers entail the tech-
nology capable of revolutionizing corporate governance); see also Blockchain 101, supra note 3, at 1 
(commenting on the popularity of bitcoin, but noting that “the true innovation” lies with decentralized 
ledgers). 
 183 See Noelle Acheson, What Is Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Jan. 26, 2018) https://www.coindesk.com/
information/what-is-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/N3WH-FB9J] (describing bitcoin as “a snippet of code 
that represents ownership of a digital concept—sort of like a virtual IOU,” contrasted with blockchain 
networks, which are “distributed network[s] that maintain[] . . . ledger[s] of balances of bitcoin[s]”). 
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how we may, one day, be able to have a robust blockchain-based securities 
market.184 
Section A of this Part introduces blockchains and distributed ledger tech-
nology and explains how they work.185 Section B of this Part discusses the re-
cent legal support for blockchain technology.186 
A. The Underlying Technology 
A “blockchain,” broadly speaking, is an electronic record keeping net-
work that transcribes transactions to an online ledger.187 Blockchains can come 
in various permutations, thus there is no one definition for what is a block-
chain.188 There are, however, common characteristics shared by all variations 
of blockchains and the distributed ledgers they generate.189 The name is de-
rived from the way a blockchain records information; transactions within a 
window of time are bundled together into “blocks” and each block is added to 
a ledger in a sequential “chain.”190 The chain builds from itself; each new 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See infra notes 187–238 and accompanying text. 
 185 See infra notes 187–216 and accompanying text. 
 186 See infra notes 217–238 and accompanying text. 
 187 See F. Dario de Martino & Spencer D. Klein, Morrison & Foerster Discusses Blockchain and 
Avoiding a Kodak-Like Downfall, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 26, 2017) http://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2017/09/26/morrison-foerster-discusses-blockchain-and-avoiding-a-kodak-like-down
fall/ [https://perma.cc/4P82-GRW6] (describing blockchains as “shared spreadsheets”); see also U.K. 
GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, supra note 3, at 17 (“A block chain is a . . . database that takes a number 
of records and puts them in a block . . . . Each block is then ‘chained’ to the next block . . . . This al-
lows block chains to be used like a ledger, which can be shared and corroborated by anyone with the 
appropriate permissions.”). Blockchain technology first hit the public market in 2008 after an uniden-
tified individual (“Satoshi Nakamoto”) published a paper about Bitcoin, a virtual currency whose 
transactions could be verified without the need for trusted or known third parties. COMM. ON PAY-
MENTS, supra note 4, at 2. See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System, BITCOIN.ORG (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML3Z-GJ2X] (describ-
ing the origins of Bitcoin). 
 188 See Blockchain 101, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing different “flavors” of blockchains). 
 189 See de Martino & Klein, supra note 187 (discussing commonalities shared by all blockchains). 
 190 Blockchain 101, supra note 3, at 1 (describing how blockchains group transactions and add 
them to sequential ledgers); see Yermack, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing the inception of blockchain 
technology as “bundling large volumes of transactions together into ‘blocks’” and that “[b]locks are 
‘chained’ together . . . because each block contains a hash function reflecting the contents of the pre-
vious block”). Although the idea for distributed ledgers began as recording each transaction individu-
ally, chunking transactions into blocks before adding them to the ledger proved substantially more 
efficient. Yermack, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing the creation of the blockchain, noting, “[a]lthough 
the original design of [distributed ledgers] featured a sequence or ‘chain’ of individual transaction 
entities, one item at a time, implementing the idea in very large markets with millions of assets re-
quired grouping many transactions together so that the need for computer memory remained reasona-
ble”). While distributed ledgers need not necessarily be generated by blockchain-based networks, 
clumping together transactions into blocks is a far more efficient process than individually entering 
transactions onto distributed ledgers. Id. Thus, for the purposes of this Note, I will use the term 
“blockchain” specifically to refer to networks that group transactions into blocks before adding them 
to distributed ledgers. Id. 
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block contains information about the new transactions to be added to the chain 
as well as information about the previous block of transactions.191 Fabricating 
or altering a blockchain-based ledger is virtually impossible because any 
change to a previous block drastically alters the information contained on sub-
sequent blocks in the chain.192 Some blockchain networks, like the Ethereum 
blockchain, leave room for lines of code to be written onto the network, ena-
bling the use of self-executing “smart contracts.”193 
Blockchains can generate distributed ledgers.194 The ledgers are “distrib-
uted” because they are accessible to all members of the specific blockchain’s 
                                                                                                                           
 191 Yermack, supra note 3, at 11–12 (discussing the self-referential nature of blockchains). 
 192 Id. at 11 (“Attempting to forge the information retroactively by changing a prior entry in the 
archive would cause changes in the sequence of all subsequent entries, since any minor alteration to 
the input of a hash function causes significant change in its output this is trivial to observe.”). 
 193 Alyssa Hertig, How Do Ethereum Smart Contracts Work?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.
com/information/ethereum-smart-contracts-work/ [https://perma.cc/9U2Y-BXSP] (describing the 
Ethereum blockchain). “Smart contracts” are lines of code, often written onto blockchain networks, 
that automatically execute the terms of contracts upon input of a certain triggering condition. COMM. 
ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 3. For example, imagine a supply-chain transaction where a manufac-
turer contracts to deliver goods via an internalized shipping arm of the manufacturer’s company to a 
distributor who will purchase those goods. See Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements 
for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 177, 179 (2017) (discussing a broad overview of how 
smart contracts would apply in sales of goods). Upon delivery of the goods, the delivery driver scans a 
barcode on the cardboard box containing the shipped goods to confirm the delivery of the goods. See 
id. The device that scans the barcode is connected to a blockchain network, of which both the manu-
facturer and the distributer are participants. See id. The scanning of the barcode could trigger the exe-
cution of a smart contract whereby, because of the successful delivery (the triggering condition), pay-
ment is transferred from the distributor to the manufacturer. See id. One can further imagine that the 
distributor keeps an electronic record of the quantity or amount of received goods (presumably on the 
blockchain network). See id. The same scanning of the barcode that triggered payment upon delivery 
could update the distributor’s internal records (because the blockchain produces a distributed ledger to 
be shared by all trusted participants) to reflect an increase in inventory. See id. The distributor, as it 
sells inventory, could reduce from its asset account the appropriate amount of goods sold, and because 
this information is stored on the blockchain network, the manufacturer could receive constant updates 
about the distributor’s current supply. See id. Without another smart contract to trigger a second deliv-
ery, the manufacturer very well could contact the distributor and ask it whether it needs another ship-
ment of goods when it notices that the distributor’s inventory is low, or simply wait for the distributor 
to contact it for another delivery. See id. But, by imposing smart contracts onto the blockchain net-
work, as soon as the distributor reports that its inventory falls below a certain threshold, a smart con-
tract could trigger, notifying the manufacturer’s warehouse that it must deliver a quantity of goods to 
the manufacturer. See id. Thus, the cycle restarts: shipping goods from manufacturer to distributor; 
confirming receipt and triggering a smart contract for payment; updating inventory received; running 
low on inventory and triggering another smart contract for another delivery. See id. Security is en-
sured by making the triggering of the smart contracts contingent upon the parties’ use of their “public” 
and “private” keys, discussed below. See id. at 179–81; infra notes 211–216 and accompanying text. 
For a more complete discussion of smart contracts, please see Kevin Werback & Nicolas Cornell, 
Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 331 (2017) (describing smart contracts on a blockchain 
network and providing an example). 
 194 See Yermack, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that distributed ledgers are “essential component[s]” 
of blockchain systems, like Bitcoin). One can say that blockchains are a type of distributed ledger. 
COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that blockchains are an example of a distributed 
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network.195 The ledger can be used to track record ownership of electronic as-
sets or provide evidence of ownership of a physical asset.196 Distributed ledg-
ers track transactions by providing a chronological compilation of its users’ 
transactions.197 
Distributed ledgers can be open to the public or privately managed.198 
Public ledgers are not updated or maintained by any one, particular entity.199 
Instead, public ledgers are open-sourced, decentralized, and maintained by all 
users of the network.200 It is unlikely for public blockchain participants to 
know one another because identities are masked by virtual pseudonyms.201 The 
bitcoin network is a prime example of a popular public blockchain.202 
Without a central administrator updating the ledger, public blockchains 
are updated by democratic consensus.203 This happens in two steps: validating 
                                                                                                                           
ledger). There are other ways, similar to standard bookkeeping, to track data, and if they do not neces-
sarily involve batching together transactions, but rather entering them one at a time. Id. Further, dis-
tributed ledgers do not necessarily need to record the transfer of assets, but can also be employed to 
manage account balances. Id. 
 195 Blockchain 101, supra note 3, at 2 (describing blockchains as “publicly viewable ledgers”); see 
ANTONY LEWIS, BRAVE NEW COIN, A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO BITCOIN 7 (2015), https://
bravenewcoin.com/assets/Reference-Papers/A-Gentle-Introduction/A-Gentle-Introduction-To-Bitcoin-
WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HJQ-ZLAX] (comparing distributed ledgers to “gossip network[s]” 
where everyone gains an understanding of the gossip while also spreading it). 
 196 COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 3. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Martin J. McHale et al., Computershare, Inc., Comment Letter on Concept Release No. 34–
76743: Transfer Agent Regulations, at 22–23 (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-
15/s72715-35.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2DJ-X9HQ] (explaining that distributed ledgers can be open to 
the public or permissioned and private). 
 199 See Yermack, supra note 3, at 12–13 (describing Bitcoin, a public blockchain, as not having a 
“sponsor or gatekeeper with the “update function . . . decentralized to all market participants in an 
ongoing competition catalyzed by the award of new bitcoins to the winner”). 
 200 Id. 
 201 COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 7; see McHale et al., supra note 198, at 20 (discussing 
the use of pseudonyms in blockchains). Some have argued that the lack of a centralized, trusted ad-
ministrator makes public blockchains less favored in national securities markets. See, e.g., COMM. ON 
PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 7 (arguing for a regulated blockchain network). 
 202 See Yermack, supra note 3, at 12–13 (noting that the Bitcoin blockchain was “motivated by 
distrust of the financial establishment” and, as a result, updating the ledger was decentralized). 
 203 Id. at 11 (explaining how public distributed ledgers publish versions of the ledger to be vali-
dated by any “interested user,” noting that distributed ledgers “essentially crowd-source[] the verifica-
tion function classically played by auditors or bank inspectors”). “Consensus” is a process where 
computers agree to a common version of a ledger COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 4. This is 
performed cryptographically, with rules or procedures (for example, a majority vote) which layout the 
prerequisites to updating the common ledger. Id. On the Bitcoin network, for example, consensus is 
reached via a “proof of work” process. Cardano Settlement Layer Documentation, CARDANODOCS, 
https://cardanodocs.com/introduction/ [https://perma.cc/3AW6-WPMV] [hereinafter CARDANO]. 
“Proof of work” means that, to update the ledger, a computer must solve a particular computationally-
dense puzzle. Id. The only way to complete the puzzle would be to present evidence that the partici-
pating computer exerted a certain amount of computing energy. Id. On the bitcoin network, that evi-
dence is publishing both the solution to the puzzle and all the transactions that made up the block to be 
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transactions and adding them to the block, then adding the block to the ledg-
er.204 By requiring a consensus to update the ledger, public blockchains are 
virtually unalterable.205 To incentivize participants to validate others’ transac-
tions, public blockchains, like the bitcoin blockchain, often offer rewards to 
validators.206 
                                                                                                                           
added to the network. Id. Because the process of mining is energy-intensive, participants with greater 
financial resources may have an unfair edge over less-equipped participants. See id. (“Mining is very 
energy consuming, and the amount of energy needed is constantly increasing, which can lead to un-
sound competition.”). In contrast, there also exist “proof of stake” consensus algorithms. Id. “Proof of 
stake” networks reach consensus by selecting network participants with probability proportional to the 
size of a participants’ holdings in a particular cryptocurrency. Id. This incentivizes participants to 
collect as many coins as they can on a given network to increase their chances of being rewarded with 
more coins. Id. Bitcoin is a proof of work network. Yermack, supra note 3, at 14. 
 204 How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK (Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Bitcoin Transac-
tions], https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-do-bitcoin-transactions-work/ [https://perma.cc/
A4LA-ANT5]. 
 205 See Yermack, supra note 3, at 14. (He described any attempt to alter a blockchain ledger as 
“prohibitively difficult” because “even a minor change in a past block would have the . . . effect of 
changing . . . all subsequent blocks. A thief . . . seeking to alter old transactions would . . . face the 
insurmountable problem of having to find valid [data] for all [blocks] up to the latest . . . . The diffi-
culty of this task explains why . . . [blockchains are] ‘immutable’.”). 
 206 See id. (describing the reward offered to network participants). The bitcoin network places all 
network participants in an ongoing competition to receive bitcoins, catalyzing both the process of 
validating transactions and adding blocks to the ledger in one swoop. Id. If John wanted to send 
bitcoins to Jane, John’s computer would first make a request of the network to change the ledger. See 
Bitcoin Transactions, supra note 204 (describing a basic Bitcoin transaction). Other network partici-
pants would then communicate with each other to verify that John has the requisite funds to transfer 
and that he did not already transfer those funds away. See id. If a majority of the network’s computing 
power agrees that John has the bitcoin required, John’s transaction is added to the block. See id. Once 
John’s transaction has been added to the block, it must then be added to the ledger. See id. In order to 
update the bitcoin proof-of-work ledger, participants must gather four pieces of information: (1) the 
previous block’s identifying information; (2) a timestamp; (3) information about transactions in the 
current block; and (4) a “nonce.” Yermack, supra note 3, at 13. A “nonce” is a random number that 
participating computers attempt to discover through computationally heavy trial-and-error processes 
(proof-of-work processes). Id. Whichever computer is the fastest (or luckiest) that finds the correct 
“nonce” will be able to complete the four-part bundle of information required to add a block to the 
chain and will be rewarded with a bounty of bitcoins (currently 12.5 bitcoins per block as of July 
2016, periodically halving to mimic inflation to traditional currencies). Id. The process for finding a 
nonce becomes more or less difficult depending on how quickly the previous nonce was found: each 
block should take about ten minutes of problem solving to complete. Id. Completing a block entails 
that a computer has verified all transactions to be added to the ledger. Noelle Acheson, How Bitcoin 
Mining Works, COINDESK (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-bitcoin-
mining-works/ [https://perma.cc/F8E5-GV58]. Although finding the nonce is computationally inten-
sive, having other network participants verify that one computer found the correct solution is simple. 
CARDANO, supra note 203. The Bitcoin blockchain has been programmed to hold and issue a limited 
number of bitcoins (21 million). Acheson, supra; see Kiviat, supra note 5, at 579 (discussing the lim-
ited total supply of bitcoins). Once all bitcoins have been “mined,” the incentive structure will likely 
shift to offering transaction fees to miners proportional to their computational efforts. See Kiviat, 
supra note 5, at 570–80; see also CARDANO, supra note 203 (describing rewards given to validators 
on proof-of-work networks). 
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Private blockchains, on the other hand, allow for substantial control over, 
and manipulation of, the ledger.207 Whereas public blockchains have no cen-
tralized administrator with authority to control the blockchain, private block-
chains can authorize trusted moderators to oversee the network.208 Moderators 
of private blockchains can restrict access to the ledger, make changes to previ-
ous blocks, and access participants’ data.209 Moderators can also control how 
and when the ledger is updated, replacing the need for network participants to 
update the ledger by consensus.210 
To maintain security, transactions on blockchain networks (both public 
and private) require two unique interrelated forms of identification to process a 
transaction: public keys and private keys.211 A public key is a publicly viewa-
ble code that allows network participants to view and verify messages or trans-
actions sent on the network.212 Private keys are the passwords that give indi-
                                                                                                                           
 207 Yermack, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing the “enormous power” held by “parties with authori-
ty to encode new transactions into a blockchain”). 
 208 See id. (“In many of the prominent blockchain applications now under development, such as 
the . . . Depository Trust Clearing Corp. in New York, the gatekeeper role is assumed by an estab-
lished ‘trusted third party’ whose actions are constrained by government regulators as well as reputa-
tional concerns.”); see also COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 7. (They describe the differences 
between public and private ledgers, noting, “At one extreme, a single entity could host and operate all 
the nodes . . . on behalf of participants and be the sole entity responsible for maintenance of the ledg-
er. Alternatively, maintenance could be shares across many entities, each responsible for having a 
copy of the ledger.”). 
 209 Yermack, supra note 3, at 12 (describing a blockchain regulator’s authority to “restrict entry 
into a market, assess monopolistic user fees, edit incoming data, treat some users preferentially, limit 
users’ access to market data, and potentially share user data with outsiders” in private or permissioned 
blockchains). 
 210 See id. at 16 n.15 (discussing the possibility of incorporating a decentralized update function 
on a private blockchain, noting that, in the case of Ovestock.com’s private blockchain, the company 
operates and updates the blockchain itself). A third class of distributed ledgers are permissioned ledg-
ers. Id. Permissioned ledgers are a happy medium between public and private: they can be open-
sourced, but do not have to be. Id. While there is a known moderator, there may or may not be con-
sensus validation protocols—updates can occur merely after a certain number of transactions or cer-
tain amount of time has occurred or passed. Id. The decision to use a public, private, or permissioned 
ledger will depend on the networks’ intended uses. Id. Transfer agents that advocate for the use of 
blockchain technology argue that permissioned or private blockchains be used to maintain control 
over private data and disclosures to network participants. See, e.g., McHale et al., supra note 198, at 
20 (arguing, because personally identifiable information “cannot be fully disclosed on the distributed 
ledger due to data privacy concerns,” that “a role will need to be retained for an entity (issuer agent) to 
compile the central register from the relevant data sets”). 
 211 Geis, supra note 4, at 257. There are many applications that serve as “wallets,” similar to 
online accounts, within which participants can store their cryptocurrencies, like bitcoin, that provide 
users public and private keys. Id. These wallets often provide the software for transfer of cryptocur-
rencies from one user to another. Id. To further bolster security, the Bitcoin network operates anony-
mously, reducing the risks of identity theft or fraud. See Huang, supra note 1, at 2102 (“Bitcoin trans-
actions are irreversible and do not involve any identifying personal information, which helps mini-
mize fraudulent activity, prevent identity theft, and shield merchants from fraudulent chargebacks.”). 
 212 Geis, supra note 4, at 257 (“The public key is analogous to an email identifier, and it allows 
others—such as a buying party—to locate the selling member in order to send funds related to the 
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viduals access to their accounts and allow users to encrypt outgoing messages 
or transactions.213 Private keys are unique to each account and cannot be 
changed once they are generated.214 Private keys enable individuals to send 
assets from their own “wallets,” or accounts, to other addresses.215 Anyone in 
possession of a private key has complete access to the wallet.216 
B. Legal Framework and Support for Distributed Ledgers 
Support for blockchain technology has come from many directions, in-
cluding courts and state, federal, and foreign governments.217 Vice-Chancellor 
Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery has even advocated for the use of 
                                                                                                                           
exchange.”); see Lewis, supra note 195, at 7 (“Just like bank accounts, if you want to receive a bitcoin 
payment, you need to tell someone your bitcoin [public key] so they know where to send bitcoins to 
[sic].”). 
 213 Geis, supra note 4, at 257. Because public keys are related to private keys, if a sender “signs” 
a transaction using their private key, anyone with access to the public key will know that the transac-
tion must trace back to one particular account. Public-Key Cryptography, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography#Typical_use [https://perma.cc/SC2N-9VXT]. An apt 
analogy is wax seals on envelopes. Id. The sealed envelopes can be opened by anyone, and everyone 
that opens it will know that the message was sent from one particular individual. Id. The keys interact 
in the following way: for Jane to send Sue bitcoins and ensure that only Sue can receive the bitcoins, 
Jane will inscribe her transaction—the transfer of a bitcoin—into a message, addressed to Sue’s ac-
count, and encrypt that message with her own private key (her wax seal). See id. Sue’s account will 
receive the bitcoins (she will open the envelope with the public key), and Sue will verify the transac-
tion by confirming that the message came from Jane (opening the message with the public key verifies 
that it must have come from Jane). See id. 
 214 Lewis, supra note 195, at 7–9. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. Because private keys are so valuable to blockchain participants, and because they cannot 
be changed once generated, private keys are often password-protected so no one can access the file 
that stores a private key unless a password chosen by the wallet holder is entered. Id. Participants on 
the Bitcoin network can send bitcoins to each other without the use of intermediaries through a com-
bination of their wallet software, their public, and their private keys. See id. To initiate a transaction 
on the Bitcoin network, a participant will first have to enter into their wallet software the amount of 
Bitcoin they wish to transfer. See id. Then, they must enter the address of the receiving wallet. See id. 
These instructions are authorized and “signed” by the user’s private key. Id. In wallets that allow users 
to encrypt their private key with a chosen password, entering the user’s password suffices to “unlock” 
the private key and verify that the transaction ought to be sent out to the network for validation. See 
id. 
 217 See Judith Alison Lee, Blockchain and Distributive Technology—Legal Landscape, Payment 
Sys. & Elec. Fund Transfers Guide 100:200, 1 (Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Legal Landscape] (discussing 
the “eager[ness]” of federal lawmakers to develop blockchain technology); Justin S. Wales & Matthew 
E. Kohen, State Regulations on Virtual Currency & Blockchain Technologies, Payment Sys. & Elec. 
Fund Transfers Guide 100:400, 1 (Dec. 1, 2017) (compiling data on virtual currencies and blockchain 
technology for states); see, e.g., Helen Partz, Corporate Stockholders in Russia to Vote Via Blockchain, 
COINTELEGRAPH (Dec. 14, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/corporate-shareholders-in-russia-to-
vote-via-blockchain [https://perma.cc/7Z2S-CYQT] (discussing Russia’s “clear interest” in developing 
Blockchain technology, “both in the public and private sectors”). 
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blockchain technology in corporate record keeping.218 The sweeping praise for 
blockchain technology all hums the same tune: blockchains are faster, more 
secure, and more accurate than traditional record-keeping methods, such as the 
DTC system.219 This, however, doesn’t provide a legal basis for their use.220 
Businesses must maintain a keen focus on the extent to which state and federal 
law permit the use of blockchain technology, if they do so at all.221 
There is currently no consensus among states about the legality of block-
chain technology, but there appears to be a slow trend towards acceptance of 
the technology.222 For example, in 2017, Delaware amended its corporate law 
to allow corporations to use blockchain technology to create and maintain rec-
ords, including stock ledgers, and to communicate with stockholders via 
blockchain.223 The changes also provide that records stored on a blockchain 
will be admissible in evidence just like their paper counterparts.224 
                                                                                                                           
 218 See In re Dole Food Co. (Dole), 2017 WL 624842, at *4 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017); Laster, 
supra note 11, at 16. 
 219 See, e.g., Laster, supra note 11, at 16 (“Distributed ledger technologies can provide better 
accuracy, greater transparency, and superior efficiency for settling securities trades and voting in cor-
porate elections.”). 
 220 See, e.g., Svikhart, supra note 5, at 111 (discussing the potential for the federal Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (“ESIGN”) to preempt state law governing block-
chain technology and virtual currencies). 
 221 See id. (discussing the uncertainty surrounding ESIGN and its potential effect on state block-
chain law). 
 222 Wales & Kohen, supra note 217, at 1. 
 223 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224 (2016) (permitting “[a]ny records administered by or on 
behalf of the corporation . . . including its stock ledger, books of account, and minute books” to be 
stored on “one or more electronic networks or databases (including one or more distributed electronic 
networks or databases), provided that the records so kept can be converted into clearly legible paper 
form within a reasonable time”); see also id. § 219 (defining “stock ledger” to mean “records adminis-
tered by or on behalf of the corporation in which the names of all of the corporation’s stockholders of 
record, the address and number of shares registered in the name of each such stockholder, and all 
issuances of stock of the corporation are recorded in accordance with § 224 of this title”). Communi-
cation with stockholders via blockchain means that corporations can deliver proxy materials, prospec-
tuses, and any other relevant stockholders information, by first identifying stockholders entitled to 
receive such information through the corporations’ stock ledger, then delivering that information elec-
tronically by releasing it on the blockchain network, similar to a mass email. See id. §§ 219, 214; 
Donald, supra note 22, at 93 (discussing the benefits to stockholder communications on a blockchain 
network, opining that communications with stockholders directly, rather than through financial inter-
mediaries via proxy, would be economically efficient, noting, “[if] an issuer had direct access to elec-
tronic addresses for its security-holders, mass communication would be no more expensive than send-
ing the original notice to the [central securities depository]”). 
 224 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224. Vermont and Arizona have adopted similar measures. 
Wales & Kohen, supra note 217, at 2, 12. Vermont has made a determination that blockchains are 
reliable enough to be produced in court as self-authenticating evidence. See Joanna Diane Caytas, 
Blockchain in the U.S. Regulatory Setting: Evidentiary Use in Vermont, Delaware, and Elsewhere, 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (May 30, 2017), http://stlr.org/2017/05/30/blockchain-in-the-u-s-
regulatory-setting-evidentiary-use-in-vermont-delaware-and-elsewhere/ [https://perma.cc/7LVW-
LDHE] (describing blockchain’s regulatory landscape and recent Vermont legislation). Arizona rec-
ognizes as enforceable: (i) records produced on a blockchain, (ii) contracts that execute on a block-
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Public corporations have similarly expressed interest in blockchain tech-
nology.225 Following Delaware’s amendments to its corporate law, Over-
stock.com has begun to issue shares of its stock via private blockchain.226 The 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”) has contracted with IBM 
to develop blockchain technology compatible with the derivatives market.227 
Initial coin offerings have also become increasing popular crowdfunding ave-
nues, seeing a 3000% increase in funding in 2017, amassing over $6.5 billion 
in funds raised.228 
Federal lawmakers expressed mixed attitudes towards the use of block-
chain technology.229 In September 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives 
expressed its interest for the U.S. Government to develop and explore the use 
                                                                                                                           
chain, and (iii) enforces ownership rights if they were secured by transactions on blockchains. Id. New 
York legislators have recently proposed a bill to investigate the potential benefits and uses of block-
chain technology. A08793, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
 225 See, e.g., Ryan Browne, Blockchain Technology Being Considered by More Than Half of Big 
Corporations, According to Study, CNBC (July 31, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/31/
blockchain-technology-considered-by-57-percent-of-big-corporations-study.html [https://perma.cc/
A4VT-D8VR] (discussing widespread acceptance of blockchain technology by corporations); 80+ 
Corporations Working on Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://
www.cbinsights.com/research/organizations-corporates-test-blockchains-distributed-ledgers/ [https://
perma.cc/WHT6-DDUJ] (discussing recent corporate trends in blockchain technology development, 
including efforts by Microsoft, FedEx, and Maersk to develop and incorporate blockchain technology 
for their businesses). 
 226 Cade Metz, Overstock Begins Trading Its Shares Via the Bitcoin Blockchain, WIRED (Dec. 15, 
2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/overstock-com-issues-stock-via-bitcoin-blockchain/ [https://
perma.cc/2S9R-9Y9U] (noting that Overstock.com issued over 126,000 shares of its “internet-only 
stock” on a private blockchain). Overstock.com oversees its own blockchain, but still publishes a copy 
of the transactions on its private ledger to the Bitcoin ledger for the sake of complete transparency. Id. 
 227 Michael del Castillo, $11 Trillion Bet: DTCC to Process Derivatives with Blockchain Tech, 
COINDESK (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/11-trillion-bet-dtcc-clear-derivatives-blockchain-
tech/ [https://perma.cc/6GTD-M3AA]. 
 228 Yuji Nakamura, Startups Are Raising Billions Using Initial Coin Offerings, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-22/startups-are-
raising-billions-using-initial-coin-offerings [https://perma.cc/DG3H-237H]. An initial coin offering 
(“ICO”) is a method of raising money for financing a business without issuing stock. Nathaniel Pop-
per, An Explanation of Initial Coin Offerings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/27/technology/what-is-an-initial-coin-offering.html [https://perma.cc/TMC7-M8U3]. Com-
panies raise funds by selling a newly minted cryptocurrency, typically developed by the fundraising 
company, to be used in the future on that company’s network. Id. For example, BET is a virtual coin 
designed by a company that seeks to build an online casino by raising money through an ICO. Id. The 
investors in the ICO can use the coins they received for their investment as virtual chips at the BET 
casino. Id. Unlike typical stock offerings, coin offerings do not provide investors with an equity stake. 
Id. Ostensibly, people purchase coins in ICOs because they wish to actually use the services provided 
by the issuing company (and they hope the value of the coins will go up). Id. After an ICO, the issued 
coins are transferrable through an open market like any other currency or stock. Id. 
 229 See Caytas, supra note 224 (“Regulatory responses . . . to blockchain . . . range from excite-
ment to suspicion to indifference.”). 
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of blockchain technology.230 Subsequently, a bipartisan Congressional Block-
chain Caucus led by Representatives Mick Mulvaney and Jared Polis was an-
nounced to further promote blockchain research.231 Neither the bill nor the 
caucus have culminated into legislative action.232 
Regulation promulgated by federal agencies tends to focus more on 
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies rather than the underlying blockchain tech-
nology.233 In the criminal sphere, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) recognized cryptocurrencies as devices to effectuate money laun-
dering and financial terrorism.234 In the tax realm, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) treats cryptocurrency as property.235 The Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission considers cryptocurrencies to be “commodities” under 
the Commodity Exchange Act.236 In his testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Jay Clayton, the Chair-
man of the SEC, expressed the view that issuances of cryptocurrencies to raise 
capital fall within the definition of “securities” under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1933 and are thus subject to federal regulation.237 Moreover, the SEC 
released a statement that online cryptocurrency trading platforms must register 
with the SEC as national exchanges.238 
                                                                                                                           
 230 Legal Landscape, supra note 217, at 1 (discussing the “eager[ness]” of federal lawmakers to 
develop blockchain technology); see H.R. 835, 114th Cong. (2016) (advocating that the United States 
adopt policy to explore the potentials of blockchain technology). 
 231 Legal Landscape, supra note 217, at 1; Jerry Brito, Bipartisan Blockchain Caucus Formed in 
Congress, COIN CENTER (Sept. 26, 2016), https://coincenter.org/entry/bipartisan-blockchain-caucus-
formed-in-congress [https://perma.cc/N3CG-252L]. 
 232 Caytas, supra note 224. 
 233 See, e.g., de Martino & Klein, supra note 197 (discussing recent federal regulations on crypto-
currencies). But see Samuel Pearse & Tim Wright, Gibraltar’s Financial Services Regulator Adopts 
First-Ever Purpose-Built Blockchain Regulations, J.D. SUPRA (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.
com/legalnews/gibraltar-s-financial-services-36749/ [https://perma.cc/SLW2-FLWZ] (discussing 
Gibraltar’s requirement that firms which desire to use distributed ledger technology for “transmitting 
payments, recording transactions and similar use cases” will need to receive a license from the Gibral-
tar Financial Services Commission). 
 234 Caytas, supra note 224. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Chairman’s Testimony on Virtual Currencies: The Roles of the SEC and CFTC, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-virtual-currencies-oversight-
role-us-securities-and-exchange-commission#_ [https://perma.cc/AR42-J8L4] (noting that “many in 
the ICO space have sought to [raise capital to fund an enterprise]” using crypto currencies, and that 
“determining what falls within the ambit of a securities offer and sales is a facts-and-circumstances 
analysis”). 
 238 See generally Unlawful Platforms, supra note 2 (discussing recently regulatory requirements 
imposed on cryptocurrency exchanges). 
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III. BACK TO THE FUTURE: BLOCKCHAIN OPTIMIZES  
DELAWARE APPRAISALS 
Blockchain technology extends far beyond merely supporting the ex-
change of cryptocurrencies.239 At their core, blockchains and distributed ledg-
ers can eliminate the need for financial intermediaries in a range of transac-
tions.240 Blockchains instantly create permanent records of transactions for all 
to see, enabling investors to directly own their shares, clear transactions quick-
ly, and optimize voting without having to rely on costly third party over-
sight.241 Replacing financial intermediaries with distributed ledger technology 
could save somewhere between fifteen and twenty billion dollars per year by 
2022 in fees and costs associated with outsourcing, clearing, and settlement.242 
One of the upshots of blockchain technology is its ability to address pro-
cedural snags in appraisal law.243 As it stands, Delaware’s failure to recognize 
the distinction between beneficial and record holders has created costly and 
unfortunate outcomes in appraisal litigation for both stockholders and corpo-
rate defendants.244 Issuing shares via blockchain can safeguard stockholders’ 
compliance with Section 262’s procedural requirements while also ensuring 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Here’s Why Blockchains Will Change the World, FOR-
TUNE (May 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/08/why-blockchains-will-change-the-world/ [https://
perma.cc/WDC6-HSQP] (opining on the uses for blockchain technology, including recording “birth 
and death certificates, deeds and titles of ownership, financial accounts, votes, [and] provenance of 
food”); see also Blockchain 101, supra note 3, at 2 (opining that blockchain technology is not limited 
to Bitcoin transactions). 
 240 See Matthew J. O’Toole & Michael K. Reilly, The First Block in the Chain: Proposed 
Amendments to the DGCL Pave the Way for Distributed Ledgers and Beyond, HARVARD LAW SCH. 
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2017/03/16/the-first-block-in-the-chain-proposed-amendments-to-the-dgcl-pave-the-way-for-
distributed-ledgers-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/644E-93WJ] (discussing the lack of delays block-
chain technology affords investors as compared to traditional payment systems). The Bitcoin network 
was developed specifically to supplant centralized banks. Yermack, supra note 3, at 12 n.9. 
 241 Yermack, supra note 3, at 9; see Huang, supra note 1, at 2102 (describing bitcoin transactions 
as “instantaneous and borderless” without “any limitations on the time, place, or amount of its transac-
tions” and having “very low transaction fees and sellers have the ability to bypass the usual cost of 
accepting a credit card payment”). 
 242 Yermack, supra note 3, at 19 (proposing that blockchain technology can save costs by “re-
duc[ing] personnel and streamlining [] processes”); see Chris Skinner, Applying Blockchain to Clearing 
and Settlement, THE FINANSER (Feb. 2, 2018), https://thefinanser.com/2016/08/applying-blockchain-
clearing-settlement.html/ [https://perma.cc/DE2Z-83JA] (reporting that “inefficiencies in the global col-
lateral management market are costing banks $4 billion annually” and that “distributed ledger technology 
could reduce banks’ infrastructure costs . . . by between $15–20 billion per annum by 2022”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 243 See Laster, supra note 11, at 16 (opining that distributed ledger technologies offer solutions to 
problems with corporate voting and stock ownership). 
 244 See id. at 7, 8 (discussing In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. July 30, 
2015)) and opining that outcome “was an example of people doing what they should do and then get-
ting caught up by the system”). 
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that those stockholders are fairly held to their burdens to demonstrate that they 
did not vote in favor of the merger and are entitled to appraisal.245 
There are, however, real roadblocks that stymie a massive securities over-
haul: whether to use a public, private, or permissioned blockchain; ensuring an 
ability to process a large volume of transactions quickly; how to replace exist-
ing intermediaries smoothly; and compliance with existing law.246 Many of 
these concerns can be quickly assuaged in virtue of distributed ledgers’ proven 
ability to handle cryptocurrency transactions.247 Moreover, even though block-
chain technology is still in its infancy, there is reason to be hopeful that, with 
time, the technology could easily handle the transaction loads of current tech-
nology.248 
This Part argues that blockchain technology has the potential to cure ap-
praisal deficiencies created by the depository system in a manner consistent 
with existing Delaware law, and discusses potential pitfalls to the prototypical 
public blockchain in a robust securities market.249 Section A argues that block-
chain-based securities can be issued directly to investors without the need for 
DTC to hold stock certificates in a way that comports with existing Delaware 
appraisal law.250 Section A also argues that, although blockchain technology is 
premised on total decentralization, it is unlikely that a robust securities market 
would be completely unregulated.251 Section B argues that blockchain-based 
securities can be traced—votes and transfers can be tracked back to particular 
shares of stock and stockholders—which restores stockholders burdens to 
prove that their shares were not voted in favor of a merger, and may have a 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See supra notes 254–308 and accompanying text. 
 246 OLIVER WYMAN, supra note 5, at 14 (discussing “hurdles to adoption” of blockchain technology, 
opining that the transition to a blockchain network will be a slow process); Marco A. Santori, Delaware 
Share Ownership and the Blockchain, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REGULATION (June 24, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/24/delaware-share-ownership-
and-the-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/QQ48-9TJM] (opining on the hardships of finding consensus 
among financial institutions on a uniform blockchain network). For example, although the practical bene-
fits of faster settlement may be apparent, the legal authority for settlement finality by blockchain is still 
uncertain. See Santori, supra (“Legally-cognizable settlement finality on a blockchain is an unproven 
theory . . . . [I]t is an open question whether distributed ledger shares . . . are recognized under the law.”). 
 247 See Yermack, supra note 3, at 9 (opining on the benefits that blockchain technology provides). 
 248 Sean Williams, 3 Cryptocurrencies Processing 1,500 (or More) Transactions Per Second, 
MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/02/01/3-cryptocurrencies-
processing-1500-or-more-transac.aspx [https://perma.cc/DL7B-V9LT]. Currently, Visa can process 
roughly 24,000 transactions per second. Id. Even in their infancy, however, there are at least three 
blockchains able to process 1,500 transactions, or more, per second: Ripple, which has partnered with 
American Express and Banco Santander can process 1,500 transactions per second; the NEM block-
chain, at 4,000 transactions per second; and Raiblocks, with a whopping 7,000 transactions per sec-
ond. Id. 
 249 See infra notes 254–308 and accompanying text. 
 250 See infra notes 254–280 and accompanying text. 
 251 See infra notes 254–280 and accompanying text. 
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deterrent effect on appraisal arbitrageurs.252 Section C argues that, because 
blockchain-based securities could be issued directly to investors, investors 
would no longer lose their rights for trivial reasons, like from conflicting 
stock-certificate policies at custodial banks.253 
A. Seceding from Cede: Direct Share Ownership 
Recall that almost all publically traded shares are actually held of record 
by Cede & Co.254 As a result, transactions at the investor level (and even at the 
broker level) involving public stock often involve nothing more than exchang-
es of IOUs—debits and credits of beneficial rights within DTC’s electronic 
book-entry system.255 Cede, at all times, retains legal title to the securities, and 
Cede assigns beneficial rights to the shares it holds in its fungible bulk to cus-
todial banks and brokers, who then re-assign the rights to investors.256 As illus-
trated by Transkaryotic in 2007, BMC Software and Ancestry in 2015, and Dell 
Dissenters in 2016, the pro rata apportionment has made it impossible to de-
termine, without evidence extrinsic to DTC, whether any one particular share 
purchased after the announcement of a merger was voted for the merger, even 
for record holders.257 Moreover, Dell Ownership, in 2015, revealed that actions 
by financial intermediaries can deny stockholders the ability to opt out of dis-
favored transactions when they reissue shares without stockholders’ consent.258 
Blockchain technology can resolve these stock-tracing problems by eliminat-
                                                                                                                           
 252 See infra notes 281–300 and accompanying text. 
 253 See infra notes 301–308 and accompanying text. 
 254 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell Ownership), 2015 WL 4313206, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 30, 
2015); see supra notes 118–123 and accompanying text. 
 255 Eha, supra note 178 (analogizing publicly traded stock to “IOUs”). 
 256 Id. (noting that the record holder is always Cede, irrespective of how many beneficial owners 
trade shares); see In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. (Transkaryotic), 2007 WL 
1378345, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (describing the assignment of rights through Cede’s fungible 
bulk system). 
 257 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell Dissenters), 143 A.3d 20, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2016) (im-
plicitly acknowledging that Cede’s fungible bulk, makes it impossible to determine how particular 
shares were voted in the absence of evidence extrinsic to Cede); In re Ancestry.Com, Inc.(Ancestry), 
2015 WL 66825, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (affirming the Transkaryotic court’s consideration of 
inability to trace votes back to shares in virtue of Cede’s ownership structure, finding that plaintiffs 
need not put forward evidence of how their shares were voted so long as “Cede . . . had sufficient 
shares not voted in favor of the merger . . . to cover the number of shares for which [plaintiff] sought 
appraisal”); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc. (BMC Software), 2015 WL 67586, *4 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 7, 2014) (“Noticeably absent from [Section 262(a)], or any language in [Section 262], is an 
explicit requirement that the stockholder seeking appraisal prove that the specific shares it seeks to 
have appraised were not voted in favor of the merger.”). 
 258 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *10. 
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ing intermediaries, ensuring that beneficial owners hold full title, not mere 
contractual rights against institutions higher on the chain.259 
Blockchains and distributed ledgers eradicate the beneficial ownership 
problem by allowing corporations to issue stock directly to investors, effective-
ly handing investors electronic stock certificates.260 Securities issued on a 
blockchain could be the actual shares themselves, rather than a book-entry po-
sition that evidences ownership in an undifferentiated pool of stock.261 Each 
individual share could be tracked and traced from issuance to ownership—
irrespective of how many times or how often the shares change hands—by vir-
tue of unique transaction identifiers for each share.262 Moreover, each network 
participants’ account could display a comprehensive list of that account’s prior 
transactions to further track ownership.263 Rather than rely on DTC to track 
and net trades between participating banks and brokers, that information can 
be stored directly on the ledger, accessible to all participants, and automatically 
updated without the need to net transactions.264 
                                                                                                                           
 259 See Fox, supra note 12 (noting that issuing shares on a blockchain “raises the possibility of 
cutting out intermediaries” and “investors would be able to directly own shares”). 
 260 See COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing assets that exist solely via digital 
ledgers, noting that “distributed ledger[s] [can be] employed to record ownership”); Fox, supra note 
12 (describing blockchain networks in the context of corporate ownership); see also Donald, supra 
note 22, at 97 (discussing a direct ownership system where securities are issued without paper stock 
certificates, noting that “transferring uncertificated securities would mean that every owner of the 
security would simultaneously become to registered owner,” and that “the distinction between ‘bene-
ficial’ and ‘registered’ owners would disappear (except in cases where the security-holder chose to 
remain anonymous . . . )”); Laster, supra note 11, at 20 (opining that distributed ledgers create a “uto-
pian version of share ownership system” without beneficial ownership, only record ownership). One 
can imagine securities “issued” on a blockchain in a number of ways: creating unique cryptocurren-
cies, each created by different issuing corporations and made tradeable on one network, that act as a 
share of stock. See Yermack, supra note 3, at 16 (describing “tokens” that can represent shares of 
stock on the blockchain network). Alternatively, shares of securities could be encoded onto the trans-
fer of bitcoin (or any other coin). See id. For example, if Jane were to transfer one share of ABC Cor-
poration to Amy using bitcoin, Jane could transfer a trivial amount of bitcoin to Amy (like an amount 
less than one tenth of one cent), and include, attached to the transfer, a message, contract, or other 
information that would represent, or even serve as, the delivery of title of the share to Amy. See id. 
 261 See Donald, supra note 22, at 98 (advocating for a securities settlement model based on the 
transfer of actual securities, not claims on securities held by centralized intermediaries); COMM. ON 
PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing blockchain’s ability to track actual record ownership of 
electronic assets). 
 262 Yermack, supra note 3, at 17 (discussing blockchains’ transparency). 
 263 Id. Further, the network could be programmed to allow accounts to have “sub-accounts,” 
whereby intermediaries (like banks and brokers) could maintain their assets on the distributed ledger 
through their own principal account, then keep track of their clients’ shares within the sub-accounts. 
Id. All the accounts—principals and subs—would be viewable on the distributed ledger to determine 
custodial possession by the broker but registered ownership by the investing clients. Id. 
 264 Yermack, supra note 3, at 9 (describing blockchain’s benefits for stockholders, including no 
longer needing financial intermediaries to track transactions). This model could look nearly identical 
to the transfer of bitcoins on the Bitcoin network. See Kiviat, supra note 5, at 594, 603 (discussing the 
“basic structure” of blockchain networks, opining that while “this basic structure was designed for 
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Issuing shares via blockchain not only fixes the beneficial ownership 
problems, but can be done without changing existing Delaware appraisal 
law.265 Rather than changing the appraisal statute to account for indirect own-
ership, returning the securities market to direct ownership would realign both 
Delaware’s presumptions about securities ownership and the underlying secu-
rities market.266 By issuing shares via blockchain, Delaware corporations could 
still rely on their stock ledgers to determine record ownership, with the only 
difference being that those ledgers would list stockholders with an actual eco-
nomic stake in the shares, not just Cede.267 This would eradicate the trouble-
some inconsistency whereby Delaware recognized prorated ownership in 
Cede’s fungible bulk under Delaware’s securities laws, but assumes direct 
ownership under Delaware corporate law.268 
Returning the securities market to direct ownership would probably not 
remove DTC from the picture entirely because it is possible that DTC would 
                                                                                                                           
transferring ownership of bitcoins[,] . . . they can also transmit richer forms of information,” and that 
“blockchain-based currencies share some economic properties with commodity money, and legal 
definitions support their characterization as a commodity”). One commentator provided an apt exam-
ple of a “utopian” picture of securities transactions: two clients are connected through an exchange 
medium on a blockchain network that instantaneously confirms each party has the wherewithal to 
complete a transaction by reviewing the ledger. See OLIVER WYMAN, supra note 5, at 10. Both parties 
agree to execute the transaction by having their private keys deliver access to their funds or assets, 
then transfer those assets using public keys. See id. The transaction is distributed to network partici-
pants to be validated and added to the distributed ledger upon a subsequent ledger update. See id. 
 265 Laster, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing Delaware corporate and securities law). 
 266 Id. at 7, 20 (advocating for the implementation of blockchain technology as a way to resolve 
problems ensuing from the beneficial-record owner distinction); see Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, 
Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, 
HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Mar. 16, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-
infrastructure-of-corporate-finance/ [https://perma.cc/XC3Q-SU5Y] (opining that “distributed ledger 
shares would also solve an inconsistency between corporate and securities laws); see also Donald, 
supra note 22, at 97–98 (noting that the Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Committee originally 
supported an uncertificated system of securities transfer in 1978). 
 267 See Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *4 (only requiring corporations to rely on their in-
ternal “records as the sole determinant of membership in the context of appraisal”); Donald, supra 
note 22, at 97 (noting that transfers of stock issued via decentralized networks would occur simply by 
updating the issuer’s records). This scenario is simple to imagine: first, a corporation issues shares by 
registering the names of banks, brokers, and directly purchasing individual investors on its distributed 
stock ledger. See Donald, supra note 22, at 97–98 (“A transferee obtains ‘control’ over an uncertifi-
cated security by having his name entered on the [issuing corporation’s] list.”). In the case of individ-
ual investors, they hold both title and beneficial rights to their newly purchased stock. See id. (discuss-
ing how issuing uncertificated shares on a decentralized network would rid the securities system of 
beneficial owners, unless the choice to remain a beneficial owner was voluntary). Banks and brokers 
that purchase the issued stock would have their names on the ledger, but transfer of shares to their 
clients could also update the corporation’s stock ledger to reflect the change in ownership from broker 
to client. See id. Although there would be no paper stock certificate to issue to banks and brokers, they 
could still “hold” shares of their clients on their behalf by maintaining wallets or accounts which hold 
their clients’ electronically-issued securities. See id. 
 268 See Laster, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing Delaware’s internal inconsistencies). 
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shift from a centralized title holder to a network regulator, overseeing transac-
tions and preventing fraud.269 Although a public blockchain has its benefits, it 
is difficult to imagine a world where government authorities and regulators are 
willing to cede their power to decentralized markets without any oversight ca-
pabilities.270 It is likely that an entity, like DTC, would oversee a blockchain-
based securities market.271 In fact, DTC is currently developing permissioned 
distributed ledgers.272 
Although possible, it is also unlikely that banks, brokers, and other inter-
mediaries would completely dissolve from the picture.273 Intermediaries pro-
mote trust and reduce the risk of fraud in transactions.274 It is also easier for 
investors to find willing buyers and sellers with the help of broker intermediar-
ies.275 Moreover, given the niche market for financial intermediaries that has 
developed to make the indirect ownership system more efficient, it is unlikely 
these actors would willingly have their roles replaced without trying to find 
                                                                                                                           
 269 See Geis, supra note 4, at 263 (proposing, “it is possible to imagine a world of complete disin-
termediation, where individual investors join exchanges directly, downloading software to participate 
as a full member of a distributed ledger,” and later discussing how “there are many reasons to believe 
that complete disintermediation will not occur”). 
 270 See id.; McHale et al., supra note 198, at 20 (opining that a permissioned ledger “is most like-
ly to be [implemented in] securities markets). Commentators debate whether markets would benefit 
from a truly decentralized and autonomous securities market, or whether there ought to be some de-
gree of regulatory oversight. Compare Chris Dixon, Why Decentralization Matters, MEDIUM (Feb. 18, 
2018), https://medium.com/@cdixon/why-decentralization-matters-5e3f79f7638e [https://perma.cc/
CF8L-QLL7] (arguing for the use of decentralized financial networks as a means to promote econom-
ic growth by “winning the hearts and minds of entrepreneurs and developers”), with McHale et al., 
supra note 198, at 19–20 (proposing that, in the context of transfer agents, distributed ledgers will still 
require the maintenance of “a central securities register” because “legal/regulatory and operational 
aspects will require . . . a master security-holder file administered by an agent on behalf of the issuer, 
which would integrate the distributed ledger of transactions rather than being replaced by it”). 
 271 See Geis, supra note 4, at 263–64 (opining on the future of blockchain-based securities mar-
kets). DTC can control which participants have the ability to update the distributed ledger. See U.K. 
GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, supra note 3, at 44 (proposing ways in which government authorities 
could regulate distributed ledgers by either imposing regulations on private parties or building re-
strictions into the distributed ledger networks themselves). DTC could allow banks to update the ledg-
er with each transaction, in batches, or at the end of each trading day. Cf. id. at 36 (describing benefits 
blockchain technology could provide banking services). This could allow banks to use the same or 
similar netting procedures they have used in the past to optimize securities transfers. Cf. id. 
 272 Yermack, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing DTC’s blockchain application, wherein DTC takes 
on a “gatekeeper role . . . whose actions are constrained by government regulators as well as reputa-
tional concerns”). 
 273 See Geis, supra note 4, at 263–64 (opining that it is unlikely investors would deny the advice 
of financial services professionals in blockchain-based securities market). 
 274 Kiviat, supra note 5, at 606 (discussing the “trust” intermediaries bring to transactions); see 
Geis, supra note 4, at 263–64 (noting that “some investors will continue to enjoy the useful financial 
advice that they receive from experts, and they might be loath to trade directly”). 
 275 Geis, supra note 4, at 263–64 (opining that it is unlikely investors would deny the useful ad-
vice of financial services professionals in blockchain-based securities market). 
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their way to fit in a blockchain-based direct ownership system.276 Even in a 
blockchain-based securities market, banks and brokers would probably take on 
an intermediary role, facilitating the execution of transactions.277 In this pic-
ture, DTC would likely give particular banks and brokers access to the block-
chain network and issuing corporations could issue shares directly to those 
banks and brokers, rather than to DTC.278 The banks and brokers could then 
decide with their clients whether to transfer title directly to their clients, or 
hold the shares and merely transfer beneficial rights to their clients (to main-
tain liquidity and ease of trade).279 DTC would maintain control over confiden-
                                                                                                                           
 276 See Donald, supra note 22, at 91–94 (discussing the ways in which broker-dealers and banks 
benefit from the indirect holding system). For example, investors have grown accustomed to leaving their 
securities within the hands of trusted brokers, and brokers have enjoyed the benefits of holding custom-
er’s securities in their name. Id.; see Geis, supra note 4, at 263–64 (proposing reasons for why investors 
will continue to use financial intermediaries in a blockchain-based securities market, including receiving 
financial advice, or investing in mutual funds or hedge funds to mitigate risk). Moreover, because of the 
legal rift between record holders and beneficial owners in the indirect holding system, an entire market 
has developed to facilitate the distribution of proxy materials. See Donald, supra note 22, at 93 (“Com-
panies like Broadridge exist only to reap profits from the current depository system’s negative externali-
ties. Such companies look at the creation of a . . . system of direct registration [as] . . . an open threat to 
their very existence.”). 
 277 Geis, supra note 4, at 263–64 (providing reasons why financial intermediaries would continue 
to exist in a blockchain-based securities system). But see Kiviat, supra note 5, at 574 (proposing that 
blockchain, as a “trustless” technology, facilitates trade, clearing, settlement, and enforcement without 
“the presence of a trust third party or central institution”). 
 278 See U.K. GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, supra note 3, at 44 (proposing ways in which regulatory 
bodies could maintain authority over a blockchain network). It is difficult to justify a position where 
individual investors are actually purchasing shares directly from issuers or on a marketplace without 
some sort of intermediary guidance. See Geis, supra note 4, at 263–64 (discussing that some investors 
will still enjoy the ease associated with having their trades executed through the use of brokers). Even 
to purchase Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency on a purely public blockchain, investors typically turn to man-
aged marketplaces that facilitate settlement and clearing. Jake Frankelfield, Coinbase: What Is It and 
How Do You Use It?, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.investopedia.com/tech/coinbase-
what-it-and-how-do-you-use-it/ [https://perma.cc/4HEA-HQLK] (discussing the typical approaches to 
investing in cryptocurrencies). For example, Coinbase, a popular cryptocurrency exchange, offers 
useful services to investors, like acting as a centralized bank to hold investors’ Bitcoins, and provides 
an electronic marketplace for participating investors to buy and sell various cryptocurrencies. Id. In-
vestors can also purchase cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin, directly from Coinbase. Id. Coinbase facili-
tates transactions by connecting sellers with potential buyers by scanning its internal register of listed 
sales. Id. These transactions, while facilitated through the Coinbase exchange, are verified, cleared, 
and settled through the actual Bitcoin blockchain. Id. In this capacity, Coinbase merely acts as a trans-
action facilitator. Id. This is probably the picture one would expect in a blockchain-based securities 
market: banks and brokers would retain their role of acting as intermediaries, finding willing buyers 
and sellers and facilitating transactions through a marketplace. Cf. id. (describing Coinbase’s role as a 
transaction facilitator). DTC would oversee these transactions, but all clearing and settling would 
occur on the blockchain network itself. Cf. id. 
 279 See Donald, supra note 22, at 97 (noting that, where the distinction between record holder and 
beneficial holder dissolves, stockholders can still choose to have their shares held on their behalf). 
This picture could look similar to the current system: DTC participants could band together and join a 
private blockchain, moderated by DTC, where the participating banks and brokers would have rights 
to view and update the ledger. See Geis, supra note 4, at 264. An investor could query the market via 
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tial information, voting decisions, and the like, while preventing hacks and 
fraud from destabilizing the market.280 
B. Disaggregating the Bulk: Tracing Votes Back to Shares 
Blockchain technology can also make it possible to determine whether 
particular shares were voted in favor of a merger, irrespective of when a stock-
holder purchased them.281As illustrated by Transkaryotic in 2007, BMC Soft-
ware and Ancestry in 2015, and Dell Dissenters in 2016, Cede’s fungible bulk 
has made it impossible to determine, without evidence extrinsic to DTC, 
whether any one particular share purchased after the announcement of a mer-
ger had been voted for the merger, even for record holders.282 In 2016, in Dell 
Dissenters, when faced with such extrinsic evidence, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery established a burden-shifting rule to handle situations where evi-
dence actually existed of how shares were voted in a merger.283 The court held 
that a corporation can put forth evidence indicating how the petitioners’ partic-
ular shares were voted by prior owners to defeat a petitioner’s prima facie 
                                                                                                                           
its broker. Id. The broker could facilitate the execution of the trade and also update the distributed 
ledger. Id. It is likely inefficient for brokers to be transferring title back and forth between clients and 
across other banks’ and brokers’ clients. Wilcox & Holch, supra note 30, § 11.01 (explaining that 
many investors prefer to have their shares held on their behalf by intermediaries, like brokers, to “ex-
pedite stock transfers and subsequent re-registration”). To facilitate faster trading, it is likely that 
brokers would hold title to stockholders’ shares and then make actual transfers at the end of a day, 
netting positions within the brokers’ books, and making trades between other brokers and banks. Cf. 
id. Alternatively, the network could be programmed to allow accounts to have “sub-accounts,” where-
by intermediaries (like banks and brokers) could maintain their assets on the distributed ledger 
through their own principal account, then keep track of their clients’ shares within the sub-accounts. 
Cf. id. All the accounts—principals and subs—would be viewable on the distributed ledger to deter-
mine custodial possession by the broker but registered ownership by the investing clients. See Geis, 
supra note 4, at 263–64 (describing distributed ledgers and the role of intermediaries in a blockchain-
based market). 
 280 See Frankelfield, supra note 278 (describing Coinbase’s role as a transaction intermediary). At 
least one transfer agent has advocated that a central authority to moderate and oversee the ledger is 
necessary for blockchains to be fully incorporated to the public securities sphere. McHale et al., supra 
note 198, at 19. This model works if it assumes that whatever blockchain system were to be imple-
mented would be private, not public. Id. at 20. 
 281 See Yermack, supra note 3, at 17 (discussing blockchain’s ownership transparency). 
 282 See Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 36–37, 56 (implicitly acknowledging that Cede’s fungible 
bulk, makes it impossible to determine how particular shares were voted in the absence of evidence 
extrinsic to Cede); BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *5 (considering plaintiff’s argument that share-
tracing is impossible in virtue of Cede’s fungible bulk holding structure); Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, 
at *5–6 (affirming the Transkaryotic court’s consideration of inability to trace votes back to shares in 
virtue of Cede’s ownership structure, finding that plaintiffs need not put forward evidence of how 
their shares were voted so long as “Cede . . . had sufficient shares not voted in favor of the merger . . . 
to cover the number of shares for which [plaintiff] sought appraisal”). 
 283 Dell Dissenters, 143 A.3d at 53–54 (describing the burden-shifting analysis). 
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claim that Cede did not vote in favor of a merger with sufficient shares to cov-
er petitioners’ appraisal demands.284 
Without having to change this analysis, blockchain technology would 
make defendant corporation’s evidentiary burden lighter.285 Blockchain tech-
nology would provide a record of all transfers of stock, including how that par-
ticular share of stock was voted.286 Shares can be encoded with information 
about voting decisions that would affix to the distributed ledger, making it easy 
to keep track of how each share was voted.287 
Taken to the extreme, the burden-shifting rule in Dell Dissenters (and the 
lack of a share tracing rule promulgated by Transkaryotic) would be moot; ra-
ther than giving stockholders the boon of not having to prove their particular 
shares were not voted in favor of the merger, the distributed ledger would hold 
petitioners to their burden, as record holders, of compliance with section 
262(b).288 
There is reason to believe that blockchain record keeping would dissuade 
appraisal arbitrageurs as well.289 Arbitrageurs rely on being able to purchase a 
                                                                                                                           
 284 Id. Following this decision, commentators have suggested that appraisal arbitrageurs would 
likely aim to purchase shares in the open market, as opposed to approaching individual stockholders 
with large stakes in a corporation, to increase their chances that the purchased shares could not be tied 
back to a vote. See Reder & Onyeador, supra note 41, at 294 (arguing “appraisal arbitrageurs . . . will 
likely purchase shares only from disparate investors in the anonymous open market to decrease the 
chance that those shares could be traced back to a vote in favor of the merger”). With the imposition 
of blockchain technology, however, the benefit conferred by purchasing shares veiled by Cede’s fun-
gible bulk dissipates. Cf. id. A blockchain-based network would nullify any chance that shares pur-
chased on the open market could not be traced back to a vote. Cf. id. 
 285 See Laster, supra note 11, at 20 (noting that blockchain technology allows stockholders to be 
aware, at all times, of who owns a particular security). 
 286 See Tinianow & Long, supra note 266 (discussing the inaccuracies in the proxy voting system 
and proposing blockchain technology as a solution). 
 287 Id. For example, voting via blockchain could occur by issuing non-value holding tokens to 
registered owners proportional to their ownership in a corporation. See Piazza, supra note 3, at 293 
(describing a token-based corporate governance voting regime). To ensure that the voting-tokens 
could be traced back to particular shares, the tokens could be programmed to automatically encode a 
number to the vote-token that matches a number encoded to a particular share of stock. See Yermack, 
supra note 3, at 23 (“In a blockchain election, eligible voters would receive tokens that they could 
transmit to addresses on the blockchain to register their preferences.”). Owners could then vote their 
tokens by sending them to a particular “yes” or “no” address. See id. Because transfers of voting-
tokens would occur on a blockchain network, the votes could be traced back to individuals and their 
particular shares. See id. This would ensure that there are no duplicate votes, because each share 
would have a unique identifier and there would only be one vote-token assigned to any individual 
share. See id. 
 288 See Piazza, supra note 3, at 293; see also Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *4 (finding the 
burden of meeting the dissenter requirement lies with record holders). 
 289 See Ancestry, 2015 WL 66825, at *1, *6–7 (refusing to impose a share-tracing requirement, 
finding that arbitrageur petitioners did not have to prove the particular shares purchased after the rec-
ord date were not voted in favor of the merger); see also BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *6 
(same). It is a further question, one beyond the scope of this Note, whether deterring appraisal arbi-
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chunk of shares after the announcement of a merger to find undervalued 
deals.290 Previously, arbitrageurs could haphazardly purchase blocks of shares 
and rest assured that they did not have to prove that their shares were not voted 
in favor of the transaction.291 Implementing a record keeping system that 
makes it easy to track and trace ownership upends that logic; voting signatures 
would be tied directly to individual shares and would be searchable on the 
blockchain, making share-tracing a viable reality.292 Recall that, in the case of 
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, additional information can be coded onto the 
transfer of a coin, like a message or a contract (or even voting preferences).293 
These encodings are indelibly etched onto the ledger after the transactions are 
verified.294 Thus, arbitrageurs would have to proceed with caution before pur-
chasing a bundle of shares in the hopes of seeking appraisal, perhaps discour-
aging the strategy altogether.295 
On the other hand, if information about how particular shares were voted 
was made publically available, it may create a temporary market where shares 
that veto or abstain from a merger are worth more than shares that vote in fa-
vor of the merger because vetoes and abstentions provide access to the ap-
praisal remedy.296 One can even imagine a scenario where, because arbitra-
                                                                                                                           
trage is, in fact, a desired outcome. See BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *5 (finding that Section 
262 permits arbitrageurs to seek out investments through the appraisal remedy). 
 290 See BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *5 (discussing defendant corporation’s argument that 
“absent a share-tracing requirement ‘an appraisal arbitrageur . . . could purchase most or all of a cor-
poration’s shares after the record date without securing proxies or revocation of proxies, and then seek 
appraisal for those shares even though the record-date holder voted them for the merger”); Korsmo & 
Myers, supra note 10, at 1566 (discussing arbitrageurs’ ability to purchase shares after the announce-
ment of a merger). 
 291 See BMC Software, 2015 WL 67586, at *4 (“Noticeably absent from [Section 262(a)], or any 
language in the statute, is an explicit requirement that the stockholder seeking appraisal prove that the 
specific shares it seeks to have appraised were not voted in favor of the merger.”). 
 292 See Yermack, supra note 3, at 23 (opining that voting on a blockchain network would be 
traceable just like cryptocurrencies are traceable on blockchain networks). 
 293 Id. at 16, 23. 
 294 See id. at 11, 14, 16, 23 (discussing the virtually permanent nature of information stored on a 
blockchain and the “benefits of blockchain elections”). 
 295 See Jack B. Jacobs, Pushbacks and Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage, HARVARD LAW SCH. FO-
RUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (June 28, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2016/06/28/pushbacks-and-delaware-appraisal-arbitrage/ [https://perma.cc/5QAK-KZZL] (opin-
ing that share-tracing injects unwanted uncertainty to appraisal arbitrage, namely that arbitrageurs will 
be unaware of whether the shares they are purchasing will be appraisal-eligible); cf. Reder & Onyea-
dor, supra note 41, at 294 (arguing that share-tracing dissuades appraisal arbitrageurs from haphazard-
ly purchasing shares, forcing them to act carefully). 
 296 Geis, supra note 4, at 272 (describing “bifurcated markets” that would emerge where a time 
gap between vote submissions and appraisal filings permitted arbitrageurs to target shares that did not 
vote in favor of a transaction). One can imagine a scenario, via a public blockchain, where arbitra-
geurs create an algorithm to track voting decisions of shares in a particular corporation. Id. Using that 
information, arbitrageurs may be able to target particular “no” votes or abstentions and offer holders 
of those shares consideration above the deal price, but below what they anticipate to be the value 
resulting from an appraisal proceeding. Id. This would create a scenario where “yes” votes, within a 
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geurs would offer a premium for “no” votes and abstentions, stockholders 
would veto otherwise value-producing mergers solely for immediate financial 
gain from these arbitrageurs.297 To ameliorate this potential problem, distribut-
ed ledgers in a securities market could not be wholly transparent and public.298 
Permissioned blockchains would need to allow regulators to modulate the 
amount of information being released into the market.299 Given attempts by 
states and regulators to develop rules to maintain some regulatory authority 
over blockchain networks, is unlikely that corporations would be able to track 
share ownership through a purely public blockchain.300 
C. Breaking the Authorization Chain: Dell Ownership 
If nothing else, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s holding in 2016 in Dell 
Ownership stands for the proposition that centralizing stock certificates 
through depositories causes unnecessary complications and room for error.301 
In Dell Ownership, stockholders lost their appraisal rights when, after having 
notified Cede of their intent to seek appraisal, Cede issued paper stock certifi-
cates to the petitioners’ custodial banks.302 Because of internal policies at the 
custodial banks, and without petitioners’ consent, Cede reissued those paper 
                                                                                                                           
window of time leading up until the effective date of the merger, would be less valuable than their 
“no” or abstention countervotes. Id. 
 297 Id. Evaluating the likelihood of this scenario is beyond the scope of this Note. See id. It is 
worth mentioning, however, that recent Delaware decisions have effectively slashed the appraisal 
remedy, relying heavily on the merger consideration as evidence of fair value in a transactions involv-
ing robust, open-market auctions for corporations, and setting a tone disfavoring an appraisal value 
above the merger consideration. See generally DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 
A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (holding, without creating a presumption, that, absent an explanation by the trial 
court for why merger consideration was an unreliable indicator of fair value, the merger consideration 
provides the best evidence of fair value). 
 298 See McHale et al., supra note 198, at 20 (arguing that, to protect personally identifiable infor-
mation, a permissioned ledger is necessary so that a regulatory body—an “issuer agent”—can control 
the release of information to the public); see also COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 7. (They 
described the differences between public and private ledgers, noting, “At one extreme, a single entity 
could host and operate all the nodes . . . on behalf of participants and be the sole entity responsible for 
maintenance of the ledger. Alternatively, maintenance could be shares across many entities, each 
responsible for having a copy of the ledger.”). 
 299 See Geis, supra note 4, at 273 (opining that complete transparency “may introduce privacy 
concerns” in a corporate governance context); see also Donald, supra note 22, at 98 (discussing a 
utopian, decentralized securities market based on uncertificated shares, opining that intermediaries 
would still serve a purpose, namely, that “intermediaries would process and communicate trading 
information, not own securities and information about ‘beneficial’ owners”). 
 300 See O’Toole & Reilly, supra note 240 (opining that the language in Section 224 “by or on 
behalf of the corporation” will require “some involvement by the corporation” in the maintenance and 
oversight of the blockchain). 
 301 See Laster, supra note 11, at 7 (discussing Dell Ownership, opining the outcome “was an ex-
ample of people doing that they should do and then getting caught up by the system,” and, “[t]he up-
shot for present purposes is that the complexities of the nominee system harmed stockholders”). 
 302 Dell Ownership, 2015 WL 4313206, at *9. 
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shares in the name of the petitioners’ custodian, Kray & Co.303 The result was a 
change in the record holder and the continuous ownership requirement was 
violated.304 
Blockchain technology ensures that this problem would not happen 
again.305 At all times, beneficial owners could also be record owners.306 Be-
cause stockholders would own their shares directly, there would simply be no 
room for an intermediary to hold and then remove shares from a fungible bulk 
and reissue those shares to the appraisal seeking stockholders.307 Any transfers 
would not only be recorded, but stockholders would be aware of whether they 
were giving up their rights to appraisal from an ensuing transfer because they 
would be the ones initiating transfers of legal title.308 
                                                                                                                           
 303 Id. at *3 (noting that for ordinary business reasons, like insurance requirements, internal 
recordkeeping, and theft mitigation, some banks and brokers refuse to hold certificates issued in an-
other’s name). 
 304 Id. at *9. 
 305 See Laster, supra note 11, at 16 (opining that blockchain technology could resolve stock own-
ership quandaries by dissolving the beneficial ownership regime). 
 306 See id. at 20 (noting that stock-holding intermediaries would no longer be necessary where 
beneficial owners are also legal owners). Even where stockholders opted to have their banks or bro-
kers hold their shares for them, each share could be registered in the stockholders’ name, such that 
corporate stock ledgers would accurately reflect beneficial owners as owners of the securities. See 
Donald, supra note 22, at 98 (“Every owner of a listed security would . . . become a registered owner, 
transparently holding all rights . . . unless the security-holder chose to remain anonymous.”). 
 307 See Laster, supra note 11, at 7 (reiterating that, “under current law, ownership changes driven 
by DTC’s role in the depository system are regarded as voluntary transfers,” and as a result of the 
voluntary transfer by Cede to petitioners’ custodian bank, “beneficial owners did not meet the contin-
uous ownership requirement”). 
 308 See id. at 7, 20 (discussing how stockholders lost standing to seek appraisal for no fault of 
their own, and proposing that, with blockchain technology, “stockholders could share a common ledg-
er of their holdings that allows them to keep track of the execution, lending, and settlement of securi-
ties transactions”). Albeit not a direct appraisal issue, it is still worth discussing an additional benefit 
conferred by the blockchain system: fast transaction clearing. See Yermack, supra note 3, at 19 (dis-
cussing blockchains ability to speed up execution, clearing, and settlement). Currently, transactions 
involving bonds, equities, and private debt instruments take at least three days to settle. In re Dole 
Food Co. (Dole), 2017 WL 624843, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017); Yermack, supra note 3, at 19 
(“Stock trades in the USA generally require three business days for settlement to occur and ownership 
to move formally from seller to buyer.”). Rather than the standard three-day clearing period, block-
chains can record changes to a security’s legal owner in under one day. See Metz, supra note 226 
(“On Wall Street, it still takes up to three days to settle a stock trade . . . [b]lockchain tech[nology] can 
take this from three days down (T–3) to zero (T–0).”). Participants on public blockchains take on the 
role of clearinghouses by confirming the existence of a user’s wherewithal for a given transaction. See 
COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 4, at 3–4 (discussing the transaction verification process). Even on 
a private blockchain, where parties that trust each other allow each participant to update the ledger on 
their own accord, updating the ledger acts as a form of clearing and settlement. See Geis, supra note 4, 
at 263–64 (discussing clearing and settlement of securities issued on a blockchain). Settlement picks 
up the pace by cutting out the arduous process of reconciling internal records between parties and 
relying on consensus to update the ledger. See O’Toole & Reilly, supra note 240 (“Blockchain tech-
nology enables parties to transfer assets directly to one another without the costs and delays inherently 
resulting from the involvement of intermediaries.”); see also Yermack, supra note 3, at 19 (discussing 
that transfers of stock via blockchain “would not require numerous middlemen” and would generate 
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CONCLUSION 
A wave of appraisal litigation brought by hedge funds brought to light in-
efficiencies in Delaware law. Delaware appraisal law does not currently recog-
nize that the securities immobilization regime has fundamentally changed the 
way stockholders own their securities. Rather than holding legal title, most 
stockholders of publicly traded Delaware corporations own mere beneficial 
rights in the shares they purport to own. Delaware’s failure to grapple with this 
reality cost both stockholders and corporations hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Luckily, blockchain technology offers a simple solution that comports with the 
Delaware legal framework. By issuing shares of stock on a blockchain, com-
panies can offer stockholders full legal title to their shares, rather than mere 
beneficial rights. This makes it easy to track how shares were voted in merger 
transactions to determine whether stockholders are entitled to seek an appraisal 
for the shares they own. Moreover, removing securities depositories from the 
ownership picture eliminates the possibility of accidental transfers of legal ti-
tle. As the tide of positive sentiment toward blockchain technology continues 
to swell, it is imperative that we think deeply about nonobvious ways to incor-
porate blockchain technology into commerce. The benefits of blockchain tech-
nology are far reaching, and as our world economy continues to grow and op-
timize, traditional methods of transfer and record keeping must be reconsid-
ered to keep up the pace. 
BRANDON FERRICK
                                                                                                                           
savings “from the reduction in personnel and streamlining of processes compared with those used 
currently”). In other words, shares issued on a blockchain would not have to traverse brokers’ and 
banks’ balance sheets before being netted through Cede, the transactions would instantly be recorded 
and visible for all. See Yermack, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that the current system requires “funds 
pass between brokers and their clients, and shares are transferred on the books of the brokerage and 
the ledger of the corporation, all under the supervision of [DTC]”). For example, Bitcoin transactions 
are transcribed onto the ledger once a block is mined and added to the chain, occurring approximately 
every ten minutes. Id. at 13–14. In the context of securities transactions, once a sufficient number of 
transactions have occurred, network participants could similarly bundle those transactions and add 
them to the ledger, possibly having DTC vet the transactions for an added layer of security. Id. These 
changes would prevent the catastrophe from 2017 in Dole, where roughly forty-nine million petition-
ers submitted valid claims to settlement proceeds for a class of only about thirty-two million. Dole, 
2017 WL 624843, at *4. In Dole, Vice-Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery found 
that the discrepancy was due to a combination of the three-day transaction clearing period and made 
more complex by ensuing short sales. Id. at *3–4. He found that, even with a one-day freeze on trad-
ing on DTC’s books, there were still two days where shares were passed around by beneficial owners. 
Id. at *3. While these transfers weren’t recorded on DTC’s ledger, they created a valid prima facie 
claim to settlement disbursement. Id. at *1, *3. To rectify the problem, in a footnote, Vice-Chancellor 
Laster proposed implementing distributed ledger technology to keep track of share ownership. Id. at 
*4 n.1. He opined that the open, contemporaneous, and accessible nature of distributed ledgers would 
provide accurate information as to which shares belonged to the settlement class. Id. (“Distributed 
ledger technology offers a potential technological solution by maintaining multiple, current copies of a 
single and comprehensive stock ownership ledger.”). 
  
 
